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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes China’s foreign policy towards the African continent to identify and 
explain any potential shift away from China’s previous non-intervention strategy towards 
African nations. China’s economic relationship with the African continent has grown 
considerably during the last two decades and reshaped China’s political relationship with 
the continent.  
Findings offer three main drivers—economic interests, Western pressure, and 
African pressure—compelling China towards a more interventionist role in the domestic 
affairs of African nations. Utilizing case studies from Mali and Sudan, this thesis aims to 
investigate how each driver changed China’s non-intervention strategy and identify what 
a change in China’s non-intervention strategy might indicate for its policies globally.  
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I. CHINA’S EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA: A NEW 
DIRECTION FOR CHINA’S NON-INTERVENTION STRATEGY? 
President Hu Jintao’s diplomatic trip to Sudan in 2007 marked a major shift in 
Chinese non-interventionist foreign policy towards the beleaguered nation. In a 
significantly new role, Chinese leadership encouraged the Sudanese government to 
accept peacekeepers in Darfur to relieve the conflict. China’s action in Sudan may 
indicate the beginning of a larger Chinese shift away from non-intervention in domestic 
affairs. If Sudan does mark the beginning of a new era in Chinese foreign policy, 
understanding the driving factors for such change may assist in identifying a change in 
Chinese foreign policy globally.  
Have China’s actions in Sudan demonstrated the beginning of a shift away from a 
non-interventionist driven foreign policy towards Africa? If so, what explains China’s 
move away from non-intervention? In this thesis, I plan to analyze the evolution of the 
Chinese non-interventionist driven foreign policy in Africa towards a more 
interventionist role—as witnessed in Sudan—to identify what drivers have initiated such 
a shift. For this thesis, intervention will be defined across a spectrum from low to high 
Chinese intervention in two countries—Sudan and Mali—to assess how Chinese foreign 
policy towards each nation may have evolved over time.  
In analyzing the potential for a shift in China’s non-intervention strategy, my first 
chapter will outline the importance of identifying a potential change and its implications 
for U.S.-China interactions on the African continent. I will include background 
information on Chinese involvement in Africa and some of the commonly held concerns. 
Many of these concerns center on the non-interventionist approach towards accessing 
natural resources and what non-intervention means in Chinese foreign policy towards 
Africa.  
After studying the 2013 French-led intervention in Mali and the 2007 Darfur 
crisis in Sudan, evidence points to three main drivers pressing China’s shift towards 
intervention on the African continent—Economic interests, Western pressure, and 
African pressure. As China’s economic interests have increased in African nations, its 
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efforts to protect them has also increased. China has significant economic interests in not 
only Sudan and Mali, but the broader regions surrounding each nation. The porous border 
structure in many African nations leaves a threat in one nation, a threat to many—forcing 
China to protect its economic interests regionally. Western pressure threatened China’s 
international image and detracted from its desire to become a responsible world leader. In 
an attempt to avoid its past image as a “free rider” in the international community, China 
chose to abide by Western pressure in Mali and Sudan and assisted in intervening. 
African pressure derived from individual African nations and regional, and sub-regional 
organizations compelled China to act or risk harming its image as “mutual beneficial” 
partner to African nations. Had China abstained from assisting Mali—despite Mali’s own 
request for assistance—China’s image on the continent would have suffered and 
decreased its ability to achieve its political objectives.  
The remainder of the first chapter will offer my hypothesis—which contends 
Chinese economic interests, Western pressure, and African pressure are driving Chinese 
foreign policy away from non-intervention—along with a description of methods and 
sources to be used throughout the remainder of the thesis. I will also outline previous 
literature focused on the three drivers of a Chinese shift from non-interference—
economic interests, Western pressure, and African pressure—to discuss how each might 
be changing China’s calculus towards a more interventionist driven foreign policy. I will 
outline each driver with background information and the potential causal argument 
influencing China’s evolution towards intervention.  
A. IMPORTANCE 
The recent U.S. rebalance towards Asia highlights the underlying U.S. concerns 




                                                 
1 Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance (CRS Report 
No. R42146) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012). 
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globally, Chinese economic activity in Africa has soared in the last decade. At present, 
China is Africa’s number one trading partner with trade rising from just $3 billion in 
1995, to over $166 billion at present.2 
The United States is concerned about China’s activities in Asia and its increased 
global presence—as witnessed across Africa. While China and the African continent hold 
a well-connected past based on mutual benefit, China’s economic growth has slowly 
begun to change the relationship in recent years. See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  China and Africa’s Growing Trade Relationship3 
China’s shift to a more interventionist position in the domestic affairs of African 
nations, if fully understood, introduces new opportunities for cooperation with the U.S. 
and European development strategies. The Chinese development strategy offers aid 
without the conditions tied to those of Western backed development programs. Critiques 
of China’s non-intervention strategy denounce its lack of attention to basic human rights 
                                                 
2 “More Than Minerals: Chinese Trade with Africa Keeps Growing; Fears of Neocolonialism Are 
Overdone,” The Economist, March 23, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21574012-chinese-trade-africa-keeps-growing-fears-neocolonialism-are-overdone-more; “Never Too 
Late to Scramble,” The Economist, October 26, 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/8089719.  
3 “Viewpoint: Africa Must Do More to Profit from China,” BBC News, May 21, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18143515. 
Source: BBC News (Solange Guo Chatelard, “Viewpoint: Africa Must 




and the threat it presents towards U.S. good governance programs. Conversely, Chinese 
development projects promote an economic first approach with an emphasis on 
infrastructure development, which China claims, is better sustained in the long term. A 
responsibly engaged China in domestic affairs, however, offers additional insight beyond 
the Western approach towards development and could potentially assist the United States 
in achieving its foreign policy goals across the continent in terms of promoting peace and 
security.  
Skeptics of Chinese involvement throughout Africa criticize China’s focus 
towards African natural resources and ignoring human rights. If approached responsibly, 
Chinese economic investment in African infrastructure and trade could assist in achieving 
the development goals of African nations. A responsible China increasing its awareness 
of domestic affairs in African nations promotes a mutually beneficial relationship beyond 
purely economic interests. Assessing the drivers of a shift in Chinese non-intervention 
within African nations also provides a case study for potential Chinese foreign policy 
shifts across the globe.4  
The importance of identifying a potential shift in Chinese foreign policy extends 
beyond the continent of Africa and encapsulates a global question concerning China’s 
actions as it continues to grow. China’s extending footprint in Latin America, the Middle 
East, and Southeast Asia all provide an opportunity for a similar shift away from non-
interference. Studying China’s actions on the African continent could provide a basis for 
understanding if Africa is an exception for China’s shifting foreign policy, or the 
beginning a future global trend.  
Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese foreign policy centered on non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations. One of the few areas of 
interventionist policies China supported was under the subset of peacekeeping operations 
(PKOs). China authorized minimal participation in PKOs under three conditions: (1) if 
the operation has UN authorization, (2) is requested from the state requiring intervention, 
                                                 
4 Alula Iyasu, “China’s Non-Interference Policy and Growing African Concerns,” African Arguments, 
July 18, 2013, http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/18/china%E2%80%99s-non-interference-policy-and-
growing-african-concerns/.  
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and (3) guarantees the protection of the national sovereignty of all states involved.5 As 
China continues to strive for economic and political influence around the world, its 
interactions with African states provides case studies for the evolution of Chinese foreign 
policy. While initially attempting to maintain a non-interventionist policy on the 
continent, greater dependency on the materials sourced from African nations spurred 
increased Chinese interest in maintaining stability within partner nations. China’s 
previous dedication to non-intervention is found in its own early history of being 
manipulated by outside powers and its desire to deter outside intervention in its own 
affairs. As China’s relationships with African nations have become more economically 
focused, however, China’s non-intervention ideals have become more flexible in 
definition. China has invested billions in oil infrastructure in South Sudan, for example, 
but because of the current conflict, it has lost 20 percent of oil production and deployed 
850 troops while also being forced to evacuate Chinese workers.6 This thesis identifies 
the growing Chinese support of PKOs and armed interventions in areas across the 
African continent where Chinese material interests are especially significant.  
Researching Chinese foreign policy in Africa provides a basis for understanding 
future Chinese interactions not only across the African continent but also around the 
globe. Understanding the changing nature of Chinese foreign policy can identify potential 
areas for Western cooperation with China—particularly when working through regional 
or sub-regional organizations in Africa—along with areas of contention. When the West 
approved sanctions against Sudan, China was placed in a position between pressures 
from Western-backed human rights organizations and China’s own energy concerns. The 
increased role of the international community—mainly the West—presses China towards 
increased awareness for human rights and away from non-intervention in domestic 
                                                 
5 Allen Carlson, “More than Just Saying No,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign 
Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 217. 
6 Ibid; Sudarsan Raghavan, “With Oil at Stake, South Sudan’s Crisis Matters to its Customers,” The 
Washington Post, January 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/with-oil-at-stake-the-
war-in-south-sudan-matters-to-its-customers/2014/01/20/dcca9432-7d25-11e3-97d3-
b9925ce2c57b_story.html; Drazen Jorgic, “China Takes More Assertive Line in South Sudan Diplomacy,” 
Reuters, June 5, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/05/us-southsudan-china-insight-
idUSKBN0EG00320140605. 
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affairs. The rise of China as a global power means non-intervention is no longer 
acceptable to the international community as a mainstay in Chinese foreign policy.7  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review pertaining to my research question will provide a foundation 
for identifying any Chinese foreign policy shift on the African continent. The hypothesis 
for this thesis is derived from the literature review will be separated into four parts. A 
background section will address broad level Chinese foreign policy actions in Africa, and 
the remaining three sections will address the hypotheses that economic interest, Western 
pressure, and African pressure are the main drivers in motivating Chinese foreign policy 
towards a more interventionist role.  
C. BACKGROUND ON CHINESE NON-INTERVENTION 
The evolution of Chinese foreign policy in relation to non-interventionism 
requires first identifying the early Chinese stance on sovereignty. At the center of the 
international system, national sovereignty secures the rights of nations to act 
independently in a manner best suited for the populace and general well-being of that 
nation. China historically faced numerous infringements on its sovereignty, which helped 
fuel underlying calls for non-intervention in the affairs of others and develop a strong 
belief in defending against violations of sovereignty encroachments. The post-Cold War 
period marked the beginning of a gradual shift in Chinese foreign policy towards limited 
and highly calculated participation in multilateral interventions.8  
Africa provides a unique context for understanding the gradual shift in Chinese 
foreign policy following the Cold War as calls for intervention were prevalent throughout 
the 1990s. As early as 1991, China offered limited support to operations in Somalia  
 
                                                 
7 Chris Alden, “China in Africa,” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 159–160, doi: 
10.1080/00396330500248086; Zhongying Pang, “China’s Non-Intervention Question,” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 2 (March 1, 2009): 237–238, doi: 10.1163/187598409X424315. 
8 Carlson, “More Than Just Saying No” 218, 223; Zhongying Pang, “Playing by ‘The Rules’: Is China 
a Partner or Ward?,” Spiegel Online, October 17, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/playing-
by-the-rules-is-china-a-partner-or-ward-a-584758.html.  
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during the massive humanitarian crisis there. Chinese support was reluctant and limited 
in comparison to Western standards, but for Chinese policymakers, it marked an early 
foray into interventionist politics. 9  
The gradual rise of Chinese intervention—through its participation in PKOs—in 
the 1990s took place in an international context that observed a growing trend in PKOs 
worldwide. The number of Western backed peace keeping interventions skyrocketed in 
the 1990s and the growing trend transferred to Chinese foreign policy. China gradually 
followed suit in international affairs to take a more flexible role in peacekeeping 
operations—mainly through multilateral means—while also attempting to protect 
national sovereignty.10  
1. Economic Interests 
The post-Cold War period instituted a new trend towards increased intervention 
worldwide, while also witnessing China’s rise as an economic superpower. Chinese 
companies turned towards the African continent for access to natural resources to fuel a 
growing China. Chinese economic expansion in Africa grew rapidly, so that today a 
quarter of Chinese energy imports are derived from African nations.11 While energy 
exports still maintain a high percentage of overall Chinese imports from Africa (see 
Figure 2), China has aimed to diversify its trade with African nations and begun investing 
in agriculture, technology, and manufacturing sectors.12  
                                                 
9 Carlson, “More Than Just Saying No,” 224. 
10 Carlson, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, 219–220. 
11 Manjo and Marks, “African Perspectives on China in Africa,” 21.  
12 Iyasu, “China’s Non-Interference Policy and Growing African Concerns.” 
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Figure 2.  China’s Main Import Products from Africa (%)13 
China’s investment in manufacturing across the continent provides lesser-
developed African nations an opportunity to move away from dependence on exporting 
raw materials and move towards exporting processed goods that are less susceptible to 
market fluctuation.14 For China, increasing manufacturing and production capabilities 
opens new opportunities for Chinese investment and market diversification. The African 
continent also provides China with new markets for Chinese produced goods (see Figure 
3). Through increased Chinese economic interaction with Africa over the last decade, 
China has been compelled to pay increasing attention to the domestic affairs of trading 
partners—particularly security and stability—to make certain trade is allowed to continue 
to flourish.15 Increased instability, as will be discussed in greater detail later on in each 
case study, increases the risks to Chinese infrastructure and personnel, while also 
increasing operating costs associated with the extraction of natural resources.  
                                                 
13 Open Society Foundation for South Africa, “Africa-China Trading Relationship,” South African 
Foreign Policy Initiative, August 14, 2013, http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/africa-china-trading-
relationship.  
14 Alden, “China in Africa,” 148.  
15 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Today, “China, Africa Target “New Strategic 
Partnership,” August 2012, http://www.sardc.net/editorial/sadctoday/view.asp?vol=2359&pubno=v14n5. 
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Figure 3.  China’s Top Export Products to Africa (%)16 
China’s rapid growth requires unimpeded access to oil and other natural resources 
to sustain the massive construction projects and heavy industrial enterprises domestically. 
From 2001 to 2007, China’s oil demands measured nearly 40 percent of the overall 
growth in global oil demand.17 China has also taken steps to ensure protection of its oil 
security through the diversification of oil suppliers and routes—of which African nations 
play a key role.18 As China expands its network of infrastructure at home and develops a 
middle class, energy security will continue to be a major consideration for sustaining 
development.19 With a majority of Chinese energy imports located in the developing 
world, instability creates grave concern for economic growth in China. China also 
understands the importance of avoiding the rolling blackouts of 2004, which occurred 
                                                 
16 Open Society Foundation for South Africa, “Africa-China Trading Relationship.” 
17 Erica Downs, “China’s Energy Rise” in China’s Rise in Historical Perspective (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 175. 
18 Erica S. Downs, “Insuring China’s Energy Security,” accessed May 16, 2014, 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/12/03-insuring-chinas-energy-security. 




when a lack of coal-forced consumers to utilize oil fueled backup generators—
skyrocketing China’s oil usage.20 The continued expansion of the Chinese domestic 
economy requires China to maintain a close awareness of the domestic stability within 
trading partners to assist maintaining imports.21  
The case study of Sudan provides perhaps the clearest picture of the Chinese 
dilemma in attempting to maintain a non-interventionist approach towards investments in 
Africa in the face of severe instability. While initially cooperating with the UN in 2004 to 
place an arms embargo on Sudan, China hesitated to approve sanctions against Khartoum 
in 2007. Citing the concern for exacerbating the crisis in Sudan, China held the belief that 
sanctions would only intensify instability and affect those least able to protect 
themselves.22 
The Chinese non-intervention strategy appeared to be based on concerns for the 
domestic stability of Sudan and fears of intervention may lead to further instability in the 
region. However, the domestic stability of Sudan was directly connected to the economic 
security of China. Sudan had become China’s fifth largest oil supplier and introduced 
deep concern for Chinese foreign policy makers in the region. Refugees from the Sudan 
crisis also spilled into neighboring oil producing Chad threatening stability in other 
nations with Chinese economic interests. Internal instability within Sudan impeded 
China’s ability to access its oil resources, which grew China’s fear of a domestic energy 
import shortage and the associated economic impacts within China—thus compelling 
China to press Khartoum into accepting peacekeepers.23  
2. Western Pressure 
The rise of Western backed interventions throughout the 1990s continually 
challenged the norms of Chinese foreign policy. Scholars identify the period of the 1990s 
                                                 
20 Downs, China’s Rise in Historical Perspective, 174–175.  
21 Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Game Changer: Coping with China’s Foreign Policy Revolution,” 
Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010): 146; Pang, “China’s Non-Intervention Question,” 242. 
22 Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 95. 
23 Ibid. 
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as the beginning of the social learning process in Chinese foreign policy through the 
efforts of the West and other nations with regards to human rights and responsibilities. 
Prior to this time, the rigid Chinese definition of national sovereignty allowed China to 
refrain from taking an active role in backing UN peacekeeping operations.24  
With the increase of Western backed interventions in the 1990s, the norms 
associated with non-intervention changed across the international community. Under the 
direction of the major powers, the UN committed to a more interventionist role in 
conducting peace building and prevention activities. China slowly followed suit and 
began working through multilateral institutions to support peacekeeping operations. The 
continued rise of China as a global power only further increased the expectations from 
the international community for China to act in a responsible manner in accordance to 
international norms, such as the responsibility to protect (R2P). The forward-leaning 
approach of R2P contended with China’s definition of non-intervention. China opposed 
the idea of conducting an international intervention without the support of a host-nation, 
but ultimately came to accept many provisions of the R2P doctrine, which will be 
discussed later. When participation in PKOs with host-nation support, however, China 
has propelled itself to the twenty-first most troop-contributing nation towards UN 
operations.25  
The gradual diffusion of Western norms in Chinese foreign policy relied heavily 
on Chinese elites accepting a refined definition of sovereignty. Chinese policy makers 
had learned throughout the 1990s that improving China’s international standing required 
some resemblance of accepting international norms. As Martha Finnemore discusses, the 
interests of states are directly connected to the international norms in which nations 
exist.26 Multilateral institutions proved to be an important mechanism for Chinese 
                                                 
24 Carlson, “More Than Just Saying No,” 219–220. 
25 Pang, “China’s Non-Intervention Question,” 238, 247; Carlson, New Directions in the Study of 
China’s Foreign Policy, 220; Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano, “Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia How 
China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect,” International Relations 25, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 
212, doi: 10.1177/0047117811404450. 
26 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 2. 
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adherence to international norms and provided the initial step towards increasing 
domestic influence abroad.27 
Sudan marks a turning point in China’s policy towards Sudan in which pressures 
from the international community and human rights organizations influenced China to 
intervene in Khartoum. China is well aware of the criticisms received during its handling 
of the Darfur crisis in which government forces instituted ethnic cleansing in response to 
armed rebel groups uprising against the Sudanese government.28 China received criticism 
shortly after the beginning of the crisis in Darfur in 2003 for opposing sanctions against 
the Sudanese government while also selling weapons to Khartoum that were used against 
the Darfuris during ethnic cleansing.29 While China continues to seek a middle ground 
between the protection of sovereignty and human rights, international reputation costs 
may challenge China’s ability to promote non-intervention. In terms of Chinese political 
self-interest, maintaining a positive image in the international arena both increases 
China’s standing amongst world powers and potentially reduces Western backed 
opposition towards China’s quest for natural resources across the African continent.30  
China’s international reputation benefits from assuring the world it is more than a 
neo-colonial power and is capable of avoiding past mistakes made by previous emerging 
world powers. Chinese awareness of maintaining a positive international image derives 
from the acknowledgement that a China perceived as contributing towards the good of 
the international community is more capable of securing beneficial partnerships with 
African nations. With a positive international reputation, China reduces the likelihood of 
other world powers balancing against it, which allows China to more efficiently pursue 
both its domestic objectives and foreign policy objectives. China is able to devote more 
                                                 
27 Carlson, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, 218. 
28 Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council, 96–97.  
29 Alden, “China in Africa,” 159–160; Opheera McDoom, “China’s Hu Tells Sudan It Must Solve 
Darfur Issue,” The Washington Post, February 2, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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30 Ian Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 178. 
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attention towards internal development and securing national power without being forced 
to prematurely compete against U.S. and Western backed pressure.31  
3. African Pressures 
Across the African continent, regional and sub-regional organizations are 
increasing in capacity and legitimacy towards identifying and resolving conflicts. At its 
creation in 2004, the African Union (AU) embarked on a journey to promote peace and 
security through an interventionist approach in regional affairs.32 The AU aimed to 
prevent genocide, war crimes, and other grave violations of human rights.33 Legal 
provisions within the AU charter crafted an interventionist vision that called for the 
collective of African nations to intervene in the domestic affairs of other nations when 
severe human rights violations were presented.  
The Chinese stance on non-intervention allows for intervention should a nation 
invite outside actors to assist, or with UN approval.34 When confronted with Western 
pressure to intervene, China upholds its principles on sovereignty and likely perceives the 
intervention as illegitimate. At the request of the AU and sub-regional organizations 
including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), China is more willing to accept 
intervention in line with its own definition of sovereignty protection. China maintains it is 
unqualified to conduct intra-state conflict resolution on its own but when requested from 
African nations, is able to intervene.35  
African pressure has changed China’s calculus on intervention, as indicated with 
the announcement of China’s “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for 
Peace and Security.” The plan aims to,  
                                                 
31 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 8. 
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Security Review 17, no. 1 (2008): 73–74, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2008.9627460.  
33 Ibid., 74. 
34 Carlson, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, 217. 
35 Li Anshan, “China and Africa: Policy and Challenges,” China Security 3, no. 3 2007): 76. 
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Deepen cooperation with the AU and African countries in maintaining 
peace and security in Africa, provide financial support for AU 
peacekeeping missions and the development of the African Standby Force, 
as well as train more security officials and peacekeepers for the AU.36  
China’s increased cooperation with the AU means China is less able to abstain from AU 
approved interventions for fear of increased local criticism, which may inhibit China’s 
ability to achieve policy objectives. Conversely, Chinese intervention in a nation with AU 
support reduces the perception of China acting as a neo-colonial power and improves its 
overall reputation on the continent.37  
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The proposed hypothesis for this thesis derived from the proceeding literature 
review is that when combined, three drivers—economic interests, Western pressure, and 
African pressure—are pushing China towards a more interventionist role in its foreign 
policy towards African nations. In analyzing the last two decades of Chinese foreign 
policy in Africa, I will attempt to identify the recent shifts in Chinese interaction utilizing 
case studies. Throughout each case study, economic interests and African pressures likely 
carry the majority of weight influencing China’s changing foreign policy on the 
continent.  
My hypothesis outlines non-intervention on a spectrum from low to high 
intervention. The proposed definition identifies several factors, which will assist in 
identifying any shift in China’s stance on intervention. For each potential driver 
considered, I will lay out the causal argument for why each may have pressed China into 
a more interventionist role in the domestic affairs of African nations. 
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1. Economic Interests 
The Chinese non-intervention foreign policy is changing in response to increasing 
Chinese economic interests across the continent. With increased economic interests, 
stability in African countries now directly affects China’s interests. Continued Chinese 
access to African resources and the ability to sustain an uninterrupted flow of resources to 
support the Chinese economy has led China to intervene in the domestic affairs of its 
trading partners to try to promote security and regime stability.  
China’s economic interests on the African continent span beyond individual 
nations. The mainly porous borders and weak state structures of the African continent 
facilitate the flow of insecurity in one nation into neighboring nations—thereby requiring 
China to maintain a regional focus. Regional instability decreases China’s efficiency in 
pursuing economic interests and increases the costs of sustaining trade. A continuation of 
non-interference would likely result in increased risks to Chinese economic interests and 
potential volatility due to instability. Similarly, with the increase in Chinese businesses 
within volatile African nations, protection of Chinese personnel and economic 
infrastructure compels China to take an increased awareness and action in the domestic 
security of trading partners.38  
2. Western Pressure 
Western pressures are convincing China to take a more interventionist role across 
the African continent. Chinese foreign policy seeks to maintain partnerships and 
cooperation with the international community to promote Chinese political leadership 
domestically and globally.39 Acting against Western norms damages China’s 
international reputation and increases friction in bilateral relations while decreasing the 
likelihood of solving global issues. A positive reputation for China potentially decreases 
suspicions of China’s rise from other nations and allows China’s continued growth while 
minimizing the risk of nations balancing against it.40 
                                                 
38 Downs, China’s Rise in Historical Perspective, 176. 
39 Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, 5. 
40 Ibid., 6. 
 16 
The implementation of R2P serves as an example a changing Western backed 
norm towards intervention, which eventually received cautious Chinese support. Human 
rights organizations and Western governments wield a significant amount of power in 
drawing attention to the downfalls of Chinese non-intervention when human rights. The 
continued norm diffusion creates challenges towards China’s attempt to withhold from 
interventions and increases Chinese involvement in domestic affairs of others to prevent 
human rights violations. Intervening in the name of terrorism is also considered a 
Western approach towards intervention. Typically cited as a major security concern to the 
West, anti-terrorism is commonly referred to as a Western motivation for intervention. 
China’s declaration of the need to intervene in Mali due to terrorist concerns, 
demonstrates China’s acquiesce towards Western pressure.  
Criticism from the international community from China acting against Western 
pressure disrupts China’s ability to focus on growth and avoid increased friction in 
achieving policy objectives. The Darfur crisis provides an example of how the 
international community rebuked China and decreased China’s ability to pursue its policy 
objectives in Sudan concerning oil. Turning away from non-intervention—in response to 
Western pressure—improves China’s reputation on the international stage and therefore 
prevents China from becoming marginalized and diverting focus away from its continued 
rise as a political power.  
3. African Pressures 
China’s non-intervention policy is predicated on the protection of sovereignty and 
the preservation of a nation’s right to govern. An exception to the Chinese non-
intervention strategy allows for intervention when a nation requests intervention within 
its own borders. When Western pressure alone may be limited in its ability to compel 
China to intervene, pressure from the African continent may hold more weight towards 
urging China to intervene. When requested from African nations or African regional and 
sub-regional organizations, intervention becomes acceptable in Chinese foreign policy 
and is less susceptible to negative reactions from the international community.  
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Support from the AU provides China a sense of local legitimacy apart from 
Western voices and provide China with a knowledgeable expert through which to provide 
support. Should China ignore requests from the AU to intervene, increased neo-
colonialism rhetoric would likely emerge across the continent—potentially reducing 
China’s ability to develop strategic partnerships and thereby reducing China’s 
preferential access to trade. The growing capacity of regional organizations, sub-regional 
organizations, and civil societies across the African continent place an increased amount 
of pressure on China and therefore increase the likelihood of China to intervene in 
domestic affairs.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
I intend to utilize a comparative study throughout my thesis. The comparative 
study will be useful to determine the extent/degree of changes in Chinese intervention 
policies post-Cold War and following President Hu Jintao’s increased efforts towards 
engagement in Africa in 2007. I have selected two nations within Africa—Mali and 
Sudan—with varying levels of Chinese involvement to compare changes over time. Each 
nation has witnessed calls for intervention in recent years. In comparing between the two 
nations, the analysis will focus on events in which the U.S. or Western-backed entities 
have called for intervention and highlight Chinese response in each occurrence. In 
choosing to study Mali and Sudan, a comparison can be made between nations with 
varying levels of Chinese investment, but with similar levels of insecurity. The insecurity 
in each nation has led to calls for outside intervention from international actors—the 
2012 Coup in Mali and the Sudan conflict—both between Sudan and South Sudan, and 
the more recent rebellion within South Sudan.  
The definition of non-intervention used throughout this thesis is more broadly 
derived from China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence adopted in 1954, which 
include, “Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
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coexistence.”41 According to Chinese foreign policy, a nation’s sovereignty includes the 
political structure within each nation. Therefore, any nation attempting to disrupt the 
government of another nation is guilty of sovereignty infringement and will not receive 
Chinese support.  
Throughout this thesis, non-intervention will be defined across a spectrum from 
low to high intervention using three determinants of non-intervention. Determinants 
include a willingness to participate in peacekeeping operations, participation and voting 
record in the UN, and conditionalities in aid dispersion.42 Comparing between the three 
nations will provide a basis for identifying if and how economic interests, Western 
pressure, African pressure appear to have shaped Chinese responses throughout each 
intervention; specifically, the following topics.  
1. Economic 
Using foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, infrastructure investment figures, 
and Chinese worker data, I plan to compare across each nation to determine how 
economic influences may have shaped Chinese foreign policy towards intervention over 
time. As China has increased its economic interaction with each nation over time, I will 
analyze the extent to which Chinese officials cited economic concerns and subsequently 
supported increased intervention. The two nations highlighted are useful case studies for 
analyzing the potential of an economic driver because each nation holds a relatively 
different level of Chinese FDI. Mali receives a relatively little Chinese FDI while Sudan 
receives substantially higher Chinese FDI.43 I will also compare between presence and 
extent of Chinese business personnel and infrastructure in each nation to identify if a 
greater contingent of each appears to change China’s calculus towards intervention.  
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2. Western Pressure 
The timeframe of interventions studied lies within the greater context of China’s 
increasing political and economic influence in international affairs (the establishment of 
United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in response to the human rights violations 
in Sudan in 2007 and the French intervention in Mali in 2012 to defeat Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Analyzing the statements and behaviors of Western 
governments during each intervention and comparing them to China’s actions will assist 
in identifying if Western pressure affected China’s decision to intervene. I will analyze 
early Western and Chinese responses to each crisis to determine if China’s agenda shifts 
towards a more interventionist approach on the spectrum previously outlined.  
3. African Pressure 
To identify the effect of African pressure on shaping China’s intervention policy, 
I will analyze the reaction of local and regional actors to determine if their requests for 
intervention compelled China. I will also compare African pressure to Western pressure 
to highlight cases when Western pressure alone may have been insufficient to coerce 
China into intervening. I will focus on the responses of regional organizations within 
Africa—mainly the AU—to determine the strength of African pressure in soliciting 
Chinese intervention.  
The analysis of China’s actions in Mali and Sudan indicate China’s move towards 
increased interventionism is based on three drivers—economic interests, Western 
pressure, and African pressure. On the spectrum from low to high intervention, both Mali 
and Sudan demonstrate a relatively high level of intervention. China’s actions in Mali 
mainly consisted of troop contributions and UN support. In Sudan, however, China 
contributed troops and played an integral role in mediation efforts in both the Darfur 
crisis and disputes with South Sudan. Evidence from Chinese officials discussing the 
need to protect infrastructure in each case study, followed by increased troop 
commitments and mediation efforts, demonstrates China’s economic interests driving its 
decision to intervene. Chinese statements outlining a desire to avoid Western labeling of 
China as a “free rider” in international politics and Western backlash to China’s actions 
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in Darfur have resulted in China’s stated acceptance of Western norms of intervention in 
Mali and Sudan. African pressure took the form of regional and sub-regional 
organizations directly requesting Chinese assistance. China subsequently provided troops 
to protect its image as a “mutual-beneficial” partner to African nations.  
The remainder of this thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter III will provide 
background on Chinese non-intervention based foreign policy and identify gradual shifts 
witnessed since the end of the Cold War. This section will assist in providing context 
towards understanding a broader shift in Chinese foreign policy towards the African 
continent. I will include information on China’s acceptance of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) doctrine and its potential influence toward China’s non-intervention 
strategy.  
Chapters III and IV will consist of case studies outlining the situations in Sudan 
and Mali. I will provide a background section on each crisis, followed by a discussion on 
how each driver outlined in my hypothesis has influenced China’s foreign policy 
behavior. The final chapter will consist of a statement of findings, a comparison between 
case studies, and a discussion on the future implications of China’s shifting foreign policy 
on the African continent.  
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II. NON-INTERVENTION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
At the center of the international system, national sovereignty secures the rights of 
nations to act independently in a manner best suited for the populace and general well-
being of that nation.44 Following the early establishment of sovereign states defined 
under the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, success of the international system has largely 
depended on maintaining each nation’s right to rule.45 While the foundations of 
sovereignty have existed for centuries, a gradual global norm shift towards increased 
intervention has appeared throughout the last two decades—slowly influencing China’s 
definition of non-intervention.46  
This chapter aims to identify the evolution of China’s non-interventionist driven 
foreign policy. Through its historical experiences, China became markedly sensitive to 
sovereignty infringements and aimed to promote its definition of sovereignty in 
international affairs. In this chapter, I will first discuss historical events in China leading 
to the development of its non-intervention strategy. Second, I will outline the changing 
international norms concerning intervention and China’s response—specifically through 
the implementation of R2P. Finally, I will discuss the evolution of China’s non-
interventionist driven foreign policy on the African continent to identify more recent 
factors leading to China’s movement away from non-intervention.  
A. THE ORIGINS OF NON-INTERVENTION 
China historically faced numerous infringements on its sovereignty, which 
arguably fueled its hypersensitive and defensive stance on non-intervention in the affairs 
of others. The period between in 1839 and 1949 is commonly referred to as China’s 
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“Century of Humiliation.”47 During the course of approximately 110 years, China 
witnessed Western powers stake claim to Chinese treaty ports to fuel the needs of the 
West while also carving up and occupying its territory. China’s limited ability to resist 
highlighted the inadequacies of the Chinese military and government capabilities in 
comparison to those of the West.48 This disruptive century in Chinese history serves as a 
unifying call for the Chinese national identity—praising China’s ability to rise above the 
humiliation of the early Western intervention.49  
Territorial disputes in and around its borders also fueled China’s predisposition to 
non-intervention.50 China’s fears of separatist threats in Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and 
others drove China’s promotion of non-intervention. The perceived threat of outside 
powers assisting separatist movements within its own territories, drives China to promote 
national sovereignty and scrutinize intervention elsewhere.51  
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping created the early PRC government to be highly 
centralized in its foreign policy development.52 Successive leadership, however, 
gradually expanded the discussion of foreign policy development to include non-
governmental organizations with the aim of promoting stability for domestic growth in 
China.53 Within the foreign policy realm, China’s stance on non-intervention continued 
to remain an important piece of the overall Chinese foreign policy strategy. 
After the Cold War, a steady shift in Chinese foreign policy towards limited and 
highly calculated participation under certain conditions in multilateral interventions 
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began.54 Following on the growing trend in international politics concerning intervention, 
China reluctantly joined the discussion and supported UN resolutions condemning Iraq in 
1990.55 Beginning with the Gulf War in 1990, China’s stance towards intervention took 
measured steps in adopting the evolving international norm.56 The first Gulf War 
displayed a combination of trepidation and disjointedness towards Chinese support for 
intervention. Initially, China voted in favor of the UN Security Council resolution against 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.57 Scholars attribute China’s early backing of the Gulf War as a 
response to pressures from the U.S. and the unanimity of agreement within the 
international community towards stopping Iraq.58 China subsequently returned to its 
posture of non-intervention and abstained from further UN resolutions authorizing the 
use of force against Iraq.59  
Chinese behavior for the remainder of the 1990s followed a similar approach of 
initial support for an intervention, pursued by misgivings citing sovereignty infringement. 
In 1992, China initially voted in favor of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to 
stabilize Yugoslavia but subsequently abstained from further votes to expand the scope of 
the mission.60 China feared the growing international norm associated with intervention 
was threatening to disrupt the foundation of national sovereignty.61 After several messy 
attempts at intervention around the world, the international community slowly retrenched 
from the practice of intervention, which lessened the friction between Chinese and 
Western definitions of intervention. Involvements such as Somalia and Kosovo refocused 
Western perceptions of promoting human rights through intervention. Chinese and 
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Western norms for intervention would cross paths once again, however, with the 
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).62  
B. CHINA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
The growing debate in the international community between maintaining 
sovereignty and protecting human rights resulted in the establishment of the R2P doctrine 
at the 2005 World Summit.63 The release of an International Commission on Intervention 
and Sovereignty (ICISS) report in 2001 prompted the early discussion on establishing a 
set of international rules to prevent human rights violations.64 R2P ushered into the 
international community tangible proof of a changing norm in the responsibilities of 
nations to protect the human rights of citizens worldwide. The ICISS report served as the 
precursor to R2P and sought to identify roles and responsibilities of the international 
community through a set doctrine.65 While the initial agenda of the ICISS report sought 
binding requirements for intervention, R2P removed mention of legally binding 
requirements in its establishment in 2005 in favor of a less obligatory doctrine to attract 
Chinese acceptance.66 
The adoption of R2P stressed the responsibility of each nation “to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”67 
The protection of individuals rests on the state itself, but should a nation be unable or 
unwilling to protect its own citizens, R2P calls on the international community to assist in 
the prevention of human rights violations.68 The R2P strategy is based on three pillars—
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the host-nation’s responsibilities, the international community’s responsibilities, and the 
use of swift action to protect human rights—should it be required.69  
With the increase of Western-backed interventions in the 1990s and the slowly 
shifting norms associated with non-intervention, R2P sought to avoid atrocities and to 
respond in the face of atrocities as witnessed in Rwanda in 1994. The massive loss of life 
in Rwanda occurred directly under what should have been the watchful eye of the 
international community. Although significant time had passed since the genocide in 
Rwanda, the international community sought to develop a consensus on when 
intervention should be considered to protect human rights. The African continent 
therefore became the focus of a growing debate on the need for intervention to protect 
human rights. The strengthening of international norms spread from the African continent 
and paved the way for the broader establishment of R2P.70 The launch of R2P aimed to 
define not only the responsibilities of the international community, but also of individual 
states in the protection of human rights.71 Initial discussions of the R2P concept received 
harsh criticism from Chinese policymakers—fearful the mandate would be used to justify 
unwarranted interventions in the domestic affairs of other nations.72  
China’s support towards peacekeeping operations matched its own highly 
calculated and sovereignty first approach towards intervention. This was in contrast to the 
more forward-leaning approach designed under R2P, which allowed for intervention 
regardless of if a host- nation requested it. China became the twenty-first most troop-
contributing nation towards UN operations in 2010 but still maintained skepticism 
towards the far-reaching aims of R2P.73 The Chinese response to R2P matched other 
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nations across East Asia that feared a growing trend in intervention threatened to remove 
the emphasis on national sovereignty. China’s reluctance resulted in lengthy debates 
within the international community to determine exactly what role R2P would take in the 
protection of human rights.74  
The Chinese approval of R2P during the 2005 World Summit was a major step in 
China’s foreign policy evolution. China joined in with the unanimous agreement of 
members of the UN justifying the responsibility of the international community to take an 
active role in protecting the human rights of individuals worldwide.75 Following the 
discussion at the 2005 World Summit, Security Council Resolution 1674 was put forward 
for international approval to the UN governing body. Resolution 1674 aimed to establish 
“the protection of civilians in armed conflict.”76 Despite initial reservations with signing 
the resolution, British-led negotiations prompted China to join the international 
community in support of Resolution 1674. China’s decision to sign the agreement 
marked a milestone in the evolution of China’s stance on non-intervention.77  
Following the acceptance of R2P, China continued to caution the international 
community of the potential for overreach of R2P backed interventions. China’s 
conservative focus of R2P hinged on its support for preventing conflict from occurring 
through building state capacity in at risk nations and in the belief that outside intervention 
can often make a situation worse.78 China has argued the true utility of R2P is its ability 
to identify potential conflict drivers early and assist in providing solutions to prevent a 
conflict from escalating.79 Chinese foreign policy experts made clear intervention is only 
acceptable in situations of “genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” and 
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should protect the sovereignty of host nations.80 Chinese policy makers also held firm to 
their belief that intervention should only be conducted when requested by a nation and 
never forced at the discretion of the international community.81 Initially, Western and 
Chinese understandings of R2P appeared distinctly different, but as the case studies on 
Mali and Sudan demonstrate, the gap between the two is lessening.  
C. CHINA’S CRITIQUE OF R2P IN LIBYA 
Chinese critiques of R2P were most recently voiced following the NATO-led 
Libyan intervention in 2011, which has been considered the first use of the R2P, 
mandate.82 Chinese scholars, such as Ruan Zongze argue,  
Supporters of responsibility to protect argue that armed intervention is a 
‘moral responsibility’ as long as it is done for ‘humanitarian purposes.’ 
However, in practice, as Libya clearly showed, it has proved nothing more 
than the pursuit of hegemony in the name of humanity.83  
China’s critiques of the NATO operation in Libya argue R2P is simply the latest 
rendition of Western attempts to justify intervention in other nations—similar to its 
previous critiques of Kosovo.84  
Chinese critics of R2P point out several key factors they believe should have been 
considered prior to intervention in Libya. First, Chinese scholars argue R2P overstepped 
its bounds during the Libyan intervention because it aimed to promote regime change in 
Libya—a concept directly at odds with the UN Charter, which should aim to protect 
government structures.85 Second, Chinese scholars emphasize the necessity of a well-
supported post-military intervention force to insure the restoration of long-term 
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stability.86 Following the 2011 NATO intervention, Libya encountered power grabs by 
local militia forces resulting in severe insecurity and widespread violence. Third, the UN 
should be the only authorized entity allowed to intervene for humanitarian purposes—
instead of a single nation or NATO.87 This prevents interventions from becoming a tool 
for regime change at the will of the international community.  
Chinese criticisms of Western efforts in Libya carried over to the ongoing crisis in 
Syria beginning in 2011. When China and Russia voted against military intervention in 
Syria, China used the Libyan example as justification for its unwillingness to intervene in 
Syria.88 Instead, China called for a diplomatic solution to the violence and increased 
humanitarian assistance in the meantime.89 As will be discussed during the Sudan 
chapter, China’s deployment of military combat troops to South Sudan, and its direct 
mediation efforts between the two warring factions, displays a noticeably different tone 
of Chinese support in comparison to its critique of Libya. 
D. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT  
Africa provides a unique context for understanding the gradual shift in Chinese 
foreign policy following the Cold War. In 1991, China offered limited assistance to 
operations in support of the massive humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Chinese support was 
reluctant and limited in comparison to Western standards, but for Chinese policymakers, 
it marked an early foray into interventionist politics.90 The pattern of limited and cautious 
engagement continued to shape China’s intervention policy across the African continent.  
Chinese involvement in Africa began in the 1950s with the establishment of 
diplomatic ties between China and Egypt.91 The Suez Crisis in 1956 found China 
supporting the Egyptian government and denouncing any efforts towards a Western 
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military intervention.92 With the beginning of African independence movements in the 
1960s, China offered support, recognition and foreign assistance to several newly 
established African nations. China was quick to offer mutual beneficial treaties focused 
on economic and technological cooperation.93  
Within the context of the Cold War, China engaged in competition with the Soviet 
Union to gain influence on the African continent.94 The broader competition between the 
Soviets and the West left China claiming to be the “true source of Marxism-Leninism.”95 
China’s opposition to not only the West, but also the Soviet Union, shaped its role as a 
supporter of African independence movements.96 The Chinese government became an 
early supplier of military support to independence movements in Angola, Zimbabwe, and 
Mozambique.97 At the same time, China also sought to secure recognition from African 
nations as the “one China” in efforts to erode support for Taiwan.98  
The fall of the Soviet Union left China without a direct threat to its security and 
opened the door for large-scale domestic growth in China. Deng Xiaoping instituted 
economic reforms aimed at opening up China’s economy to international trade and China 
began on its path towards double-digit growth.99 China’s increased emphasis placed on 
economic growth also influenced its renewed focus towards the African continent.  
In 1996, Chinese President Jian Zemin offered a “Five Points Proposal” 
identifying China’s interests on the African continent.100 Chinese foreign policy was 
outlined as, “centering around a reliable friendship, sovereign equality, non-intervention, 
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mutually beneficial development and international cooperation.”101 The proposal 
highlighted the increasing role China sought to attain in the international system—in 
particular the African continent.102  
Chinese expansion across the African continent provided partnerships with 
developing countries as an alternative to the unappealing strings attached to Western 
development projects.103 The scope of China’s foreign policy towards African nations 
articulated mutual beneficial relationships and equality aimed to attract those nations 
dissatisfied with years of perceived failed Western development programs.104 Chinese 
claims of mutual respect and mutual beneficial relationships between China and African 
nations also aimed to reduce fears of neo-colonialism from past outside encounters with 
world powers.105  
China’s perceived need for strategic partnerships also drove its foreign policy 
towards the African continent.106 The ability of China to secure partnerships with African 
nations provided China with multilateral support to promote its global interests—
specifically in the WTO and UN.107 Pressure from African nations represent a large 
portion of available multilateral support and enable China the ability to promote its 
agenda without relying on Western nations.108 
China’s economic interests also largely influenced its foreign policy strategy 
during the 1990s towards the African continent. China’s shift from net exporter to net 
importer of energy in 1993 identified the beginning of what would be a thirst for 
resources that would one day match that of the U.S.109 Today, a quarter of Chinese 
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energy imports are derived from African nations.110 China’s increased dependency on 
resources from African nations has opened a growing dialogue in Chinese foreign policy 
towards Africa—including the role of intervention. 
The large-scale growth of the Chinese economy led Chinese foreign policymakers 
to promote the opening of overseas markets.111 Overseas markets like those found on the 
African continent provide China with a source of sustainable resources to maintain the 
needs of China’s domestic economy. Chinese backed companies became a vital piece of 
China’s foreign policy decisions on the African continent, and their ability to expand 
Chinese markets is vital to the economic stability of China.112 It is through the expansion 
of Chinese industry across the African continent that intervention debates have met 
economic needs to increase China’s attention towards security abroad.113 China’s ability 
to remain dedicated to a staunch non-interventionist foreign policy slowly evolved as 
China increased its reliance on African nations.  
E. CHINA’S 2006 WHITE PAPER 
In 2006, China released its white paper on China’s African Policy detailing 
China’s strategy towards the African continent. Within the paper, China emphasized its 
efforts to promote, “mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange” 
across the continent.114 The paper outlined China’s increasing efforts towards 
cooperation with African regional organizations and the UN to promote development 
along with improved cooperation in political, economic, education, and security 
matters.115  
Politically, China’s white paper presents China’s goals towards developing 
increased cooperation between Chinese and African nations. The policy calls for 
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increased high-level visits aimed towards, “facilitating communication, deepening 
friendship and promoting mutual understanding and trust.”116 Political considerations 
also focus on Chinese consultation with African nations and a stronger commitment 
towards promoting the principle roles of the UN Charter.117  
China’s economic aims outlined in its white paper seek to increase trade, 
investment, infrastructure development, and resource cooperation.118 The theme of 
Chinese economic involvement outlined in the white paper centers on mutual benefit and 
capacity building. China also claims it will seek out international cooperation to assist 
African nations in reaching stated development goals. 
China’s peace and security goals towards the African continent aim to develop the 
capacities of African militaries. To accomplish this, China plans to increase military 
exchanges and cooperation with African nations while also assisting in training. China 
also asserts it will work through the UN to prevent and solve regional conflicts in Africa. 
China’s military support to conflict resolution will remain under its role in UN-led 
peacekeeping operations.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Chinese rhetoric surrounding its non-intervention foreign policy has remained 
relatively constant, but its actions have slowly evolved towards a more interventionist 
foreign policy. The gradual increase of Chinese intervention in the 1990s took place in an 
international context that observed a growing trend in interventionism worldwide. The 
number of Western-backed peacekeeping interventions increased in the 1990s and the 
growing trend transferred to Chinese foreign policy. China gradually followed suit in 
international affairs to take a more flexible role in peacekeeping operations—mainly 
through multilateral means—while also attempting to protect national sovereignty.119  
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The continued rise of China as a global power only further increased expectations 
from the international community for China to act in a responsible manner in accordance 
with international norms, such as the responsibility to protect (R2P). Analyzing two case 
studies—Mali and Sudan—assists in further identifying the role economic interests, 
Western pressure, and African pressure have all combined to reshape China’s definition 
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III. CASE STUDY MALI 
The 2012 crisis in Mali demonstrated a new role for Chinese foreign 
policymakers on the African continent. Following the military led coup and Al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)’s entrance into Northern Mali, the international 
community—led by the French—intervened to protect Malian civilians and stop the 
advance of AQIM. In accordance with the previously defined spectrum of intervention, 
China’s deployment of combat peacekeeping troops for the first time in its history, and its 
voting in support of the UN intervention force, signaled a highly interventionist effort to 
resolve the crisis.120 During the Mali crisis, China transitioned from opposition to 
intervention in Mali, to a highly interventionist stance following the In Amenas hostage 
Crisis in early January 2013.      
This chapter examines the influence of China’s economic interests, Western 
pressure, and African pressure on China’s transition from hesitancy towards the French 
intervention in January 2013 to China’s own deployment of combat troops in July 2013. 
Specifically, this chapter argues the security risk from AQIM threatened not only China’s 
economic interest in Mali, but also its regional petroleum and uranium mining 
infrastructure—thus compelling China to take action to protect its broader economic 
interests. Following the January 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, China deployed combat 
troops—demonstrating its increased attention to maintaining security of its own 
economic interests. Western pressure—largely under the Western established norm of 
intervention in the name of anti-terrorism—persuaded China to participate or be sidelined 
to Western efforts towards restoring stability in Mali. To bolster its image as a leader on 
the African continent, China chose to participate in intervening against the AQIM 
threat—despite China’s earlier critique of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts as being a tool to 
expand U.S. influence. Finally, African pressures—sourced from Mali, the African Union 
(AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—requested 
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international assistance, thereby convincing China to act or risk ruining its desired 
reputation as a mutually-beneficial and trusted advisor to African nations. 
The findings for the Mali case identify China’s economic interests as the most 
important factor in compelling China towards a highly interventionist approach based on 
its policy shift towards intervention following the in Amenas hostage crisis. Despite 
China’s early misgivings towards intervention in Mali, as instability increased and 
threatened China’s economic interest, China’s support for intervention in Mali increased. 
China’s extensive economic investment in the region, and the lessons it learned from 
Libya, pressed China to protect its investments in Mali following the end of the French-
led intervention in July 2013. This chapter will begin with background information on the 
conflict in Mali, followed by a discussion of economic ties between China and Mali, and 
discussions on how economic interests, Western pressure, and African pressure 
influenced China’s decision to intervene.  
A. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN MALI 
The international community optimistically watched as Mali attempted its efforts 
towards democratic consolidation in West Africa. After years of tumultuous leadership 
transitions, Mali held its first elections in 1992.121 The optimistic supporters of Mali’s 
democratic transition quickly faded in 2012, however, following a military coup that 
resulted in massive instability across the nation—and potentially the region. Subsequent 
fighting between the Malian Army and a longstanding rebellion by the nomadic Tuaregs 
in the north paved the way for Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)’s 
takeover of Northern Mali. The destabilization garnered significant Western attention and 
ultimately resulted in a French-led military intervention in January 2013.122  
The history of instability in Northern Mali began with the establishment of 
borders under French colonial rule in the late 1800s. The French entrance into North 
Africa proved a major disruption in the lifestyle of the Tuareg people and began the 
                                                 




Tuareg rebellions that have continued to present day. The arrival of the French brought 
forth a period of Tuareg dispersion and initiated the process of political marginalization 
through the creation of a formal state with formal, defined borders. The nomadic lifestyle 
of the Tuaregs was no longer accepted under French rule as the establishment of colonial 
rule required a more structured state system. Within the newly constructed borders, the 
Tuaregs found themselves in the minority compared to other ethnic groups. The 
establishment of colonial borders influenced the movement of the Tuareg societies 
towards a fight for land rights and resulted in the first Tuareg Rebellion in the early 1960s 
against the Malian government.123  
Once nations began to develop institutions and formal rules of law, the conflict 
between the Tuareg and nation states deepened. Mali and Niger hesitated to assist the 
Tuareg areas when severe droughts hit Mali in the 1970s and 1980s. During the droughts 
of the 1970s and 1980s, many of the Tuareg youth were forced to relocate to Libya and 
Algeria. The exodus of disenfranchised Tuareg youth to areas with high levels of 
militarized insurgent actors set the stage for armed conflict against the Malian 
government in the years to follow. While in Libya, Tuareg youth gained combat skills 
under the direction of former Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi, which allowed them to 
return to Mali and defeat the Malian army.124 
The severe droughts and famines of the 1970s and 1980s also raised tensions 
among the Tuareg population concerning the allocation of foreign aid distribution. The 
resultant of the dispute was the second Tuareg rebellion beginning in 1990. The Malian 
government reacted quickly and forcefully in an attempt to quell the rebellion. Their 
actions, however, resulted in multiple ethnic groups entering into the conflict and 
additional fringe youth being coerced to take up arms. Only after realizing the need for a  
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rapid solution to the problems in the north and the threats the rebellion placed on 
democratization, did the Malian government sign a temporary peace accord with the 
Tuareg.125 
The Tuaregs once again turned to violence against the Malian government in 2006 
with a series of attacks aimed towards gaining representation in the region. Mainly 
attributed to a rebel group named Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA), these attacks created unrest throughout Mali. The MNLA was able to utilize 
increased firepower acquired from the fall of the Libyan regime to drive Malian forces 
out of northern Mali and declare independence. Ultimately, in 2012, the Tuareg uprising 
in Mali resulted in a military coup, which left the door open for Al-Qaeda affiliated 
groups to subsequently take control of northern Mali.126 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) attempted to 
develop a peacekeeping operation in Mali, but because of the swift moving AQIM threat, 
military intervention had already been identified as the requisite action in Northern Mali. 
ECOWAS attempted to create a contingency plan for an intervention against AQIM 
forces in Northern Mali but failed to do so in a timely manner. The initial plan called for 
an ECOWAS force to deploy into Mali with backup from the international community. 
ECOWAS was unprepared and under equipped to engage in such a large scale task and 
the quick movement of AQIM eventually initiated a French response. As AQIM 
advanced towards Bamako, the French military took action to disrupt AQIM’s movement 
across Mali and left ECOWAS on the sidelines during the initial action.127  
Chinese officials were concerned with the reconstruction phase of the French 
intervention and feared it would present similar issues to those witnessed in Libya in 
which 35,000 Chinese workers were threatened during the instability following NATO 
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operations.128 The increase of militia groups and associated security concerns in Libya 
following the NATO intervention in 2011 caused China to remain skeptical of an 
intervention in Mali. Chinese critics of the Libyan intervention point to the nearly 5,000 
armed groups present in Libya and the poor humanitarian conditions following the 
NATO operation.129 Despite the early misgivings and fears of promoting a neo-
colonialist image on the continent, China supported UN efforts to stabilize Northern 
Mali.  
As leading Chinese expert on Africa, He Wenping, discusses, “I think the French 
military intervention was necessary. It was necessary because the situation was very 
urgent: militias in the north of Mali were attacking strategic strongholds not far from the 
capital city of Bamako.”130 Understanding China’s move from limited support to highly 
interventionist in Mali begins with first identifying China’s economic interests not only in 
Mali, but also in the greater Sahel region.  
B. ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
When AQIM threatened the stability of Mali in 2012, China’s economic interests 
were threatened not only in Mali itself, but perhaps more importantly in the larger region 
of the Sahel. The Mali case demonstrates how the rise of insecurity in one nation can 
potentially threaten China’s regional economic interests and therefore drive China 
towards intervention. This scenario is especially pertinent to African nations in which 
large, porous borders mean conflicts generally threaten multiple nations—as witnessed 
with the movement of rebel groups between DRC and Rwanda.  
Understanding China’s actions in Mali to protect its regional economic interests 
provides possible insight into future Chinese interventions on the African continent. Until 
African nations are able to possess sufficient national security structures to prevent the 
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spread of conflicts among neighboring nations, China’s economic interests in one nation 
will be directly tied to regional security. This section aims to identify China’s economic 
relationship with Mali, along with its greater economic interests in the region, to 
understand how regional insecurity threatened China’s economic interests, which resulted 
in increased Chinese intervention.  
1. Mali-China Economic Ties 
Early Sino-Mali economic ties date back to 1960 when China and Mali officially 
began diplomatic relations. The subsequent years brought various trade negotiations 
between the two nations including agreements signed in 1961 and 1978.131 In 1983, a 
mutual-benefit trade cooperation significantly increased Chinese assistance to Malian 
infrastructure projects.132 China’s contribution to Mali’s infrastructure development in 
the form of roads, buildings, and bridges continued throughout the 1990s as China’s 
investments in Sub-Saharan African increased.133  
Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Mali in 2009, combined with former Malian 
President Amadou Toumani Toure’s four visits to China from 2004-2010, represent a 
significant increase in dialogue between the two nations—much of which centered on 
economic relations.134  
While on a 2004 visit to China, President Toure vowed to “Increase economic and 
commercial cooperation between both countries.”135 True to his words, President Toure’s 
relationship with China led to significant increases in Sino-Mali economic relations. By 
2012, China had become Mali’s number one export destination (Figure 4) and number 
four import destination (Figure 5).136 FDI flow from China to Mali had also increased 
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dramatically from $1.2 million in 1999, to $210 million by 2010.137 A majority of FDI 
from China assists in funding various infrastructure development projects to include 
schools, communications architecture, and construction projects.138 
 
Figure 4.  Mali Exports to China139 
As shown in Figure 4, the majority of Mali’s exports to China consist of 
agricultural products, of which cotton is the largest. Mali is the third leading producer of 
cotton in West Africa—a region that accounts for 15 percent of global cotton 
production.140 China imported approximately five percent of its cotton from Mali in 
2012, which helps fuel the large scale Chinese textile industry.141  
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Figure 5.  Mail Imports from China142 
The economic relationship between China and Mali allows each nation to benefit 
from each other’s strengths. Mali receives much-needed infrastructure to assist in its 
development, while China receives a market for its goods along with agricultural and 
mineral products. Although the economic connections between Mali and China are 
important to consider, China’s economic interests to intervene in Mali go beyond Mali’s 
borders and arguably center on two distinct concerns: fears of regional instability, and the 
protection of Chinese citizens and infrastructure abroad. 
2. Maintaining Regional Stability 
China’s main economic concern in Mali extended beyond the borders of Mali and 
instead were focused on the threat an unstable Mali presented to the larger Sahel region. 
The Sahel region (Figure 6) includes fragile economies with histories of political violence  
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and irregular weather patterns inducing devastating droughts. The continued dependency 
on subsistence farming creates severe economic instability throughout the region making 
external investment opportunities sparse.143  
 
Figure 6.  Sahel Region144 
With porous borders throughout the region, instability easily spreads between 
nations in the Sahel leaving insecurity in one nation a threat to all.145 China’s need to 
promote regional stability in the Sahel is increasing as its reliance on resources from the 
region continues to grow.  
Mali’s neighbor to the east—Niger—began mining uranium in the early 1970s 
and has recently become the fourth highest producer of uranium worldwide.146 In 
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competition with France, China’s investment in Nigerien uranium mines has expanded 
since 2007 through the China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation (SinoU).147 
SinoU currently holds a majority stake (37.4 percent) in the Societe des Mines d’Azelik 
SA (SOMINA) mine in northwestern Mali, along with an additional Chinese company—
Zhongxing Joy Investment Company (ZXJOY Invest)—with a 24.8 percent stake.148  
 
Figure 7.  China’s Net Electricity Generation by Fuel, 2010–2040149 
China’s domestic sourcing of uranium is unable to match the needs of nuclear 
power companies within China and therefore has ignited the pursuit for additional 
resources internationally.150 China plans to boost its nuclear power capacity from 2.2 
GW in 2011 to 58 GW by 2020 (see Figure 7).  
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The growing requirements of Chinese power grids on Nigerian sourced uranium 
required China to take an active role in assuring the security of its investments abroad.151 
The potentially destabilizing flood of AQIM fighters from Mali into the Sahel threatened 
China’s economic interests thus increasing China’s willingness to support of the 
intervention in Mali. Along with the protection of access to resources, China’s need to 
protect its people and infrastructure is also growing.  
3. Protecting Chinese Citizens and Infrastructure 
Mali and the Sahel region attract little attention from typical Western markets, but 
for Chinese investors, the area has proved a viable market for Chinese goods.152 Chinese-
made goods provide a cheaply priced alternative to local markets within Mali and have 
allowed low income families a higher standard of living.153 The increase in Chinese 
exports in Mali has brought with it an increase in Chinese entrepreneurs moving to the 
region. An estimated 3000 Chinese citizens have moved to Mali in search of economic 
opportunities.154 Mali acts as a hub for Chinese businessmen in the region seeking to 
branch out to other higher paying investment opportunities in neighboring nations.155 
Following China’s increased economic footprint in Mali, Chinese-led infrastructure 
development projects have steadily increased in scope, and size.156  
Externally-funded infrastructure projects are seldom given without expectation of 
some form of return on investment—China’s funding of Malian infrastructure programs 
is no exception.157 Whether through stated obligations to a trading partner or implied, 
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Chinese investments generally have underlying expectations for repayment.158 One of 
China’s most notorious infrastructure investments in Mali took the form of five stadiums 
to be used during the 2002 Africa Cup of Nations.159 Annually, China is estimated to 
give $296 million to Mali in the form of infrastructure development.160 Other forms of 
Chinese infrastructure development in Mali include a bridge in Bamako and various road 
networks.161 While Chinese infrastructure improvements likely provide improved 
capacity to lesser developed nations such as Mali, these improvements predominately 
benefit Chinese investors in their abilities to pursue investment opportunities.  
The increase in Chinese-funded infrastructure projects and higher presence of 
around 3000 Chinese citizens in Mali has increased China’s awareness towards 
maintaining peace and stability in its trading partners. Improvements in infrastructure 
allow China to pursue its economic interests more efficiently. Insecurity threatens 
Chinese infrastructure development projects and raises the operation costs for Chinese 
investors. China’s concern for protecting its infrastructure and people is a key factor 
towards changing China’s foreign policy towards a more interventionist role on the 
African continent.  
4. China’s Response to Conflict in Mali 
As events unfolded in Mali, Chinese officials fearfully watched while insecurity 
threatened the region—potentially harming China’s regional economic interests. As 
Zhong Jianhua, China’s special representative for African affairs stated, “The risk of a 
spillover of insecurity [from Mali] is real.”162 Ambassador Zhong’s comments underline 
China’s regional concerns the insecurity in Mali presented to West Africa and the Sahel. 
Along with Ambassador Zhong’s comments, China requested Malian assistance in 
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protecting Chinese personnel and interests in Mali. Chinese Foreign minister Spokesman, 
Hong Lei, described Chinese conversations with the Malian government during a January 
2013 news conference, in which China requested Mali’s assistance in protecting Chinese 
citizens during the conflict.163 The disordered Malian government was unable to assist in 
the protection of Chinese citizens—leaving China’s economic interests in the hands of 
the international community.  
Chinese ambassador to Mali, Cao Zhongming, identified China’s growing fear for 
its economic interests in Mali and the threat to Chinese citizens abroad. Ambassador Cao 
stated, “Considering the tense situation in northern Mali, we have told Chinese 
companies in the Segou region which are quite close to the conflict, to withdraw their 
workers.”164 The instability in Mali placed Chinese personnel and infrastructure at risk, 
which pressed China to take a more interventionist approach towards Mali. Ambassador 
Cao also instructed Chinese citizens to cancel any unnecessary travel to Mali. Protecting 
its people and infrastructure investments in Mali—and throughout the region—became 
increasingly important for China as the situation in Mali deteriorated.  
Following the Chinese requests for Mali to protect its citizens and infrastructure 
in January 2013, the security situation in Mali remained precarious. While the French-led 
operation succeeded in dispersing the Islamic terrorist groups threatening Bamako, 
widespread instability and humanitarian concerns spread across Mali.165 China 
announced its decision to supply combat troops to Mali in June 2013 after initial French 
combat operations had concluded. China’s combat troops deployed to Mali were directly 
tasked with “repairing roads and bridges, safeguarding peace and stability as well as 
providing medical assistance.”166 China’s stated focus on restoring Malian  
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infrastructure—which was largely Chinese funded—demonstrated China’s rationale for 
sending combat troops to protect its economic interests and restore infrastructure—
allowing Chinese-Mali trade to recommence.  
Chinese scholars also recognized China’s decision to intervene in Mali based on 
its economic interests. Li Wentao, a researcher from the Institute of African Studies at the 
China institute of Contemporary International Relations, observed China’s increasing 
efforts to protect its economic interests in Mali commenting, “The deployment, if true, 
shows China's willingness to better help Africa address its security concerns and to 
protect growing economic interests of Chinese investors there.”167 Li Jian and Jin Jing 
from China’s Naval Research Institute (concerning the Mali intervention) argue, “We 
[China] should actively and steadily participate in regional security affairs.”168 Chinese 
scholars’ growing acceptance of the need to intervene in Mali assists in identifying the 
underlying economic motivations behind China’s move away from non-intervention 
across the African continent.  
China’s actions in Mali demonstrate how China’s economic interests shaped its 
decision to take a more-interventionist role in restoring stability in Mali. Chinese officials 
directly cited concern for Chinese citizens and interests within Mali, along with fears of 
“spillover” to surrounding nations. China then called on the Malian government to 
protect its interests, but Mali, unable to insure the protection of Chinese citizens and 
infrastructure, left China’s calls for protection unanswered. The inability of the Malian 
government to protect Chinese interests, resulted in China’s decision to deploy combat 
troops to restore Chinese-funded infrastructure and assist in protecting Chinese citizens. 
Along with its economic interests in Mali, pressures from the West also contributed 
towards shaping China’s actions towards the Mali intervention.  
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C. WESTERN PRESSURES 
AQIM’s takeover of northern Mali instigated concern from the international 
community for the potential of a “new Afghanistan” in West Africa.169 The terrorist 
organization stood dangerously close to overtaking the disheveled Malian nation and 
potentially creating a safe haven for terrorist operations throughout Africa. The nature of 
the terrorist threat faced in Mali created a Western response highlighting the need for 
intervention to prevent the spread of terrorism. While China had previously argued 
against intervention in the name of defeating terrorism in other Western-led interventions, 
China’s response to Mali was distinctly more interventionist in nature.  
This section aims to establish how Western pressure drove China towards a more 
interventionist policy in two ways. First, U.S. backed anti-terror sentiments establishing 
the need for intervening against terrorist threats following 9/11 translated to Chinese 
foreign policy, and therefore compelled China to take a more active role against the threat 
of AQIM. Second, if perceived as a “free rider” amongst global powers, China feared it 
would lose influence in international affairs.170 China’s ability to compete against 
Western power, meant it must take an active role in efforts to stabilize Mali or risk 
surrendering power to Western nations.  
1. Combating Terrorism  
In Chinese foreign policy discussions prior to Mali, the U.S. War on Terror post-
9/11 had been viewed as a tool aimed towards establishing U.S. global dominance. This 
all changed, however, after the terrorist expansion in Mali threatened the entire Sahelian 
region. Chinese criticism of early U.S. anti-terrorism efforts had argued, “Washington 
has tried to hijack international law, institutions and norms to help cloak the pursuit of 
narrow US national interests.”171 Unlike previous Chinese critisicm of the United States’ 
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use of intervention to combat terrorist threats, AQIM’s entrance into northern Mali 
garnered less Chinese pushback than previously witnessed. Chinese scholars began 
matching Western langauge to define the need for intervention against the terrorist threat 
in Mali. As Chinese African expert He Wenping articulated when asked about the 
differences between interventions in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire (in which China did not 
provide military support), “Mali is a very specific case that is different from Côte 
d’Ivoire because the militias based in the north of Mali are not simply opposition rebel 
forces — they also include terrorist groups.”172 The Chinese identification of a terrorist 
threat in Mali—particularly when the Tuareg rebellion initiated the insecurity in Mali—
mimicked Western actions of placing a greater emphasis on terrorism threats than 
rebellions in determining when or if to intervene.  
China’s justification to intervene in Mali under the premise of fighting terrorism 
allowed it to accomplish its goals of protecting its people and infrastructure, while also 
considerably reducing Western pressure. In its initial response to Mali, China tried to 
maintain its tone of non-intervention in the name of protecting soverignty. As David 
Shinn identifies, however, the standard Chinese response calling for non-intervention in 
Mali, gradually shifted to a more direct response presenting China’s willingness to 
support military action.173  
During the early stages of the French intervention in Mali, China realized the 
validity of the West’s policy of intervening against terrorist threats following the attack at 
the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria on 16 January 2013. During the attack, Islamic 
extremists took control of a gas processing facility killing 39 and disrupting Algeria’s 
hydrocarbon production by as much as 10 percent.174 While no Chinese citizens were 
killed during the attack, it served as a reminder of the economic and personal security 
impact of terorrism in the region. China’s tone following the attack became increasingly 
accepting of the need for military intervention in Mali—bringing China closer towards 
                                                 
172 China in Africa Project, “Leading Africa Expert in China.” 
173 David Shinn, “China’s Response to the Islamist Threat in Mali,” CHINA US Focus, June 21, 2013, 
http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/chinas-response-to-the-islamist-threat-in-mali/. 
174 “One Year on from In Amenas Attack,” The Economist, January 14, 2014, 
http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/281421212/one-year-on-from-in-amenas-attack/2014-01-14. 
 51 
Western standards of intervention in the name of terrorism.175 Chinese Africa-expert He 
Wenping shifted from rebuking France’s decision to intervene unilaterally in Mali prior 
to the In Amenas attack to stating, “I think the French military intervention was 
necessary. . . because the situation was very urgent; militias in the north of Mali were 
attacking strategic strongholds not far from the capital city of Bamako.”176 The In 
Amenas crisis reminded China of the direct threat terrorism presented to its interests in 
Mali, and highlighted China’s shifting stance on intervening against terrorist threat—
moving closer towards Western standards of intervention.  
2. Avoiding the “Free Rider” Stigma 
The second way in which Western pressure increased China’s willingness to 
support military intervention in Mali is found in its interest to avoid the “free rider” 
designation by Western nations. As China continues to grow as a world power, it has 
begun to desire to generate a positive image in the international community to reduce the 
threat of US and Western pressure.177 In the case of Mali, Western pressure behind 
intervention influenced China to vote in favor of the intervention to avoid negative 
repercussions from the international community associated with abstaining. Chinese 
Scholar Yun Sun articulates China’s position in Mali by stating, “[The Mali intervention] 
has raised wide-speculation in the West that China is “free-riding” again in a West-led 
mission to stabilize a country infested with terrorist threats…China strongly opposes 
being described as a ‘free-rider.’”178 In February 2013, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, 
Song Tao, also articulated a desire to avoid the “free rider” label when he discussed 
China’s contribution to resolving conflicts, stating, “Emerging economies are not free 
riders…as they continue to grow, emerging economies will take a more active part in 
international affairs to promote international cooperation and tackle global 
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challenges.”179 To increase its own standing in the international community and play a 
more pronounced role in the affairs of the African continent, China chose to avoid 
Western pressure and support the military intervention in Mali.  
The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) 
received 135 Chinese peacekeepers initially in 2013, increasing to 235 the following 
year.180 China’s vote in favor of the intervention in Mali displayed China’s increased 
propensity towards voting in support of military intervention forces. During previous UN 
votes on military intervention, China had utilized a strategy of abstaining from voting on 
specific UN issues to allow it to maintain a line between upholding its own foreign policy 
objectives, and managing tension between allied Western nations.181 Abstaining from 
voting on issues in which Chinese and Western norms clash allowed China to reduce 
negative backlash that would likely ensue should it pursue the veto option.  
Chinese scholars defended against apparent Western criticism calling China a 
“free rider” in Mali. China began a concerted effort to prove to the world it was a 
responsible member of the international community and dedicated to achieving stability 
in Mali.182 The Chinese Vice Foreign minister’s comments in February 2013 defending 
China, followed France’s entrance into Northern Mali and continued Western criticisms 
of China’s “free rider” actions in global affairs.183 Western critique of China’s actions 
cited China’s limited role in assisting in Afghanistan despite being under a UN mandate, 
and the potential Mali would be another Western-led intervention with limited Chinese 
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support.184 China reacted to Western pressure with announcements of increased 
peacekeeping support to Mali, and ultimately, the deployment of combat troops.185  
China’s adherence to Western pressure allowed it to take a more active role in the 
affairs of the African continent—boosting its image across the continent as a suitable 
contender against Western dominance. China’s decision to increase its peacekeeping 
support directly followed Western pressure questioning if China would remain a “free 
rider” while Western nations were left to address the terrorism threat in Northern Mali. 
China’s participation in the Mali peacekeeping efforts is indicative of a larger scale 
Chinese move to promote its image in the international community as a responsible world 
power.186 Supporting the Western norm of intervention in the name of combating 
terrorism allowed China to avoid criticism from the West to appear as a responsible actor 
in global politics.187  
In its official statements and deployment of combat troops, China demonstrated a 
highly interventionist approach towards resolving a security threat in relation to its 
typical stance on non-intervention. When confronted with the Western norm of 
intervention, China made a calculated decision to support efforts in Mali to reduce 
criticism from the West, but also from African nations.  
D. AFRICAN PRESSURES 
Under China’s declared non-intervention policy, international intervention is 
acceptable if a nation in need formally requests assistance.188 During the Mali crisis, 
Mali’s interim President, Dioncounda Traore, petitioned the Economic Community of 
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West African States (ECOWAS) for assistance in halting the quickly moving terrorist 
movement in the north.189 ECOWAS, aware of its lack of resources and expertise 
required to deploy to Mali, called on the UN for assistance—petitioning to the UN core 
countries to participate in resolving the conflict.190 The direct requests for assistance—
from both the Malian President and ECOWAS—prompted international support through 
the UN.  
This section will detail the role African pressure had in shaping China’s decision 
to intervene militarily in Mali. Specifically, this section aims to identify how Mali’s 
request for intervention, combined with the pressure from regional and sub-regional 
organizations, encouraged China to participate in Mali. China’s intervention policy 
identifies the acceptability for intervention when a nation requests assistance. Abstaining 
when a nation directly requests assistance from China threatens to tarnish China’s stated 
mutual-benefit relationship with African nations. China’s increased presence in Africa 
presents the likelihood African nations will call upon it to assist in intervening—pushing 
China into a more interventionist policy towards the continent.  
1. Malian Government’s Request for Assistance 
With the threat of Islamic terrorists bearing down on Bamako, the interim Malian 
government turned to the international community for support. President Traore 
contacted ECOWAS in early September 2012 and requested military forces to re-
establish security in the North.191 The formal request from Mali sought assistance in, “the 
securitization of institutions, the reinforcement of the state’s capacity to adequately fight 
terror groups, the reorganization of the army, and the restoration of Mali’s territorial 
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integrity.”192 The request was well beyond the capabilities and resources of ECOWAS, 
which turned to the UN for assistance in restoring peace and stability to Mali.  
The Malian request for assistance highlighted the need to reestablish its territorial 
integrity—speaking directly to China’s strong sense of maintaining national sovereignty. 
China held little reason to maintain a non-intervention approach towards Mali when two 
main requirements of its acceptance of intervention—request from a nation and 
protecting sovereignty—were met under Mali’s request for assistance. President Traore’s 
petition for international support required China to act under its own intervention doctrine 
or face increased pressure from African nations weary of China’s intentions as a mutual-
beneficial partner on the continent.  
2. Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations 
African regional and sub-regional organizations aim to provide African nations a 
mechanism for resolving issues on the African continent—especially during times of 
perceived inaction from the international community.193 Early ECOWAS efforts in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone aimed to promote regional stability through African-led 
initiatives, but faced severe budgetary and organizational issues.194 While these issues 
remained in place when ECOWAS declared its intentions to intervene in Mali, awareness 
of the shortfalls prompted ECOWAS to seek out the international community for 
assistance.195 Both the AU and ECOWAS petitioned for a UN Chapter VII mandate in 
response to the speedy advance of rebel and terrorist fighters in Northern Mali.196  
During the Mali crisis, head of ECOWAS, President Ouedraogo, summoned the 
assistance of the international community stating, “The success of the regional initiative 
on Mali will urgently require the involvement of the entire International Community 
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beginning with the Resolution of the Security Council, and the collaboration between 
ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), UN core countries and other development 
partners.”197 In addressing the need for both UN core nation participation and main 
development partner participation, President Ouedraogo targeted Chinese intervention 
assistance in Mali. As previously mentioned, China had been considered one of Mali’s 
closest development partners leading up to the crisis. Even more specifically, Toga 
McIntosh, the Vice President of ECOWAS, directly requested China’s support in Mali 
during a May 2013 meeting speaking with Chinese officials stating, “We will continue to 
count on your brotherly support for the stability of the country [Mali].”198 The direct 
request for China’s assistance in Mali elicited an increased Chinese response to 
peacekeeping efforts in Mali.  
3. China’s Response to Requests from Mali 
A week after the direct request from ECOWAS for assistance in Mali, China 
announced its efforts to step up support of UN Resolution 2085 and 2100—calling for the 
establishment of UN peacekeeping forces in Mali—during a press conference.199 The 
Chinese response to African pressure included emphasizing China’s role in restoring 
Malian infrastructure to assist in the addressing underlying causes of conflict in Mali.200  
Chinese peacekeeping troops also increased in number following the direct 
requests for assistance from ECOWAS. Only a week after ECOWAS requested Chinese 
assistance, Chinese diplomats announced China would be increasing its peacekeeping 
contribution to 500 soldiers in Mali.201 The decision for China to increases its 
peacekeeping forces demonstrated the role African pressure compelled China to 
intervene.  
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With Chinese foreign policy preferring to act through international institutions, 
African regional and sub-regional organizations are more likely to wield a stronger 
influence than those of Western backed initiatives. Requests from regional and sub-
regional organizations provided China the motivation it needed to support intervention. In 
the case of Mali, Western pressure alone would likely have been insufficient to garner 
Chinese support of intervention. With the requests for assistance from ECOWAS, Mali, 
and the AU, however, Beijing was able to rationalize its support of the international 
intervention in Mali.  
The evolving role of regional and sub-regional organizations offer a unified voice 
for African nations to petition China towards a more active role in maintaining stability 
across the continent. The Mali case demonstrates how the petitions from ECOWAS and 
the Malian government for assistance made China’s decision to intervene easier. 
ECOWAS and Mali both requested assistance based on restoring sovereignty and 
stability to Northern Mali—a request that matched China’s intervention strategy.202 The 
direct requests for assistance meant China could intervene without being perceived as 
acting unilaterally—which made Chinese intervention acceptable in Mali. China’s 
increase in troops following the requests from Mali and ECOWAS serve as evidence that 
when assistance was requested, China’s decision to intervene became easier, and 
therefore China became more willing to increase its support. As China’s relationship with 
African nations continues to grow, expectations for China to act responsibly in assisting 
with security threats to African nations will continue to increase.  
E. CONCLUSION 
While still a relatively new and volatile situation, the Mali intervention offers 
telling insight into not only the changing shape of Chinese foreign policy on the African 
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seemingly isolated dispute, evolved into a complex struggle threatening regional security. 
Without the intervention efforts of the international community, Mali held the potential to 
morph into a “new Afghanistan.”203  
Economic interests, Western pressure, and African pressure combined to compel 
China’s support for intervention in Mali—to the extent of even providing combat troops 
for the first time in its modern peacekeeping history.204 Spillover from the insecurity in 
Mali threatened to disrupt Chinese economic interests in the region and potentially 
institute domestic repercussions in China. China’s initial admission of its concerns for the 
protection of Chinese personnel and infrastructure in Mali—along with its subsequent 
deployment of combat troops to assist in restoring its infrastructure projects displayed 
China’s economic motivations for intervention in Mali. 
 Western pressure—through the Western predisposition to combat terrorism—
placed China in a position where abstaining from UN voting would damage China’s 
international image and increase its difficulty in achieving its policy objectives. China 
directly stated its terrorism concerns in Mali—despite the underlying Tuareg rebellion 
concerns—which displayed China’s acceptance of Western norms in treating terrorist 
threats more seriously than rebellion groups. Events such as the In Amenas hostage crisis, 
offered a tangible example to China of the destructive nature of terrorism in the region—
which channeled Chinese support towards Anti-terror efforts in step with Western-backed 
norms. Western critique of China potentially acting as a “free rider” resulted in China 
taking a more active role in Mali to protect China’s image in the international 
community.  
Combined with African pressures directed from the Malian government itself, 
along with regional and sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS, Chinese foreign 
policy evolved to allow an increasingly interventionist Chinese role in Mali. China’s 
“mutually-beneficial” relationship with African nations requires China to maintain a 
positive image across the continent.  
                                                 
203 Solomon, “Mali,” 12. 
204 Esterhuyse and Kane, CCS Policy Briefing, 2. 
 59 
When African nations requested assistance, China’s decision to intervene became 
easier, and increases the frequency in which China will intervene. Had China decided to 
abstain from assisting Mali, China’s credibility with other “mutually-beneficial” nations 
would have suffered—reducing China’s overall image on the continent. The 2011 NATO 
intervention left China concerned of similar instability in Mali post-intervention.205 To 
decrease the threat to its interests in Mali and avoid the post-intervention insecurity 
witnessed in Libya, China chose to take a more interventionist approach towards 
reconciliation in Mali and deploy peacekeeping combat troops. The direct requests from 
ECOWAS and Mali, also placed China in a position where non-intervention would 
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IV. SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN 
In perhaps one of the most well-known cases of China’s struggle between non- 
intervention and maintaining its interests, China’s interactions with Sudan marked a 
pivotal juncture in Chinese foreign policy towards the African continent. Until 2007, 
China had remained dedicated to its staunch policy of non-intervention toward Sudan. 
President Hu Jintao’s 2007 visit with Sudanese officials in Khartoum, however, signaled 
a distinct shift away from China’s previous non-intervention policy. In an attempt to 
resolve the conflict in Darfur, the Chinese President met with Sudanese leadership to 
convince them of the need for peacekeepers in the Darfur region.206 Along with the 
Chinese President’s direct mediation, China contributed a substantial peacekeeping force 
and voted in support of UN resolution 1769 authorizing the deployment of a hybrid 
peacekeeping force to Darfur. On the spectrum of intervention defined earlier in this 
thesis, China’s actions demonstrated a highly interventionist stance in Sudan.  
China’s non-intervention policy once again faced a dilemma in Sudan in 2011 and 
2013. Following the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011, trade disputes 
between the two nations disrupted oil flow from Chinese oil fields and compelled China 
to take a pronounced role in mediation. Two years later, China’s oil interests were 
threated again when an ethnic conflict erupted in South Sudan—threatening Chinese 
infrastructure and energy imports. During each crisis in Sudan, China gradually increased 
its interventionist efforts to resolve the crisis—moving from reluctance to intervene in 
Darfur prior to 2007, to a highly interventionist and pro-active approach during South 
Sudan’s conflicts in 2011 and 2013.  
The remainder of this chapter seeks to identify how economic interests, Western 
pressure, and African pressures altered China’s non-intervention strategy towards Sudan 
during the Darfur crisis in 2007, and how post-2007, China enacted its new 
interventionist role in South Sudanese conflicts in 2011 and 2013. Studying China’s 
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actions pre and post-2007 identifies China’s foreign policy evolution from a low 
interventionism, to high interventionism in the region.  
In analyzing the Chinese shift in Sudan, this chapter will first discuss China’s 
economic ties with both nations—mainly through oil exports— and how as ties 
substantially increased over the last decade, China grew more dependent on stability in 
the region. Second, this chapter will analyze the influence of Western pressure from the 
U.S. and human rights organizations during Darfur—arguing that as the West threatened 
China’s international image, China changed its posture towards Khartoum to reduce 
Western pressure. Also, Western pressure from the Darfur crisis in 2007, carried over to 
shape China’s actions in South Sudan in 2011 and 2013—therefore prompting China to 
pro-actively engage in mediation with limited Western pressure required. Third, as 
requests from the African continent for Chinese assistance to intervene in each dispute 
increased, China took a more interventionist role in the domestic affairs of each nation to 
protect its image as a mutually-beneficial partner African nations.  
A. CHINA-SUDAN BACKGROUND  
China’s early relationship with Sudan had begun in 1959 under the promise of 
non-intervention and mutual benefit.207 The long history between the two nations spans 
Sudanese civil wars in 1972 and 1983, along with the conflict in Darfur beginning in 
2003 and South Sudan’s secession in 2011.208 Prior to 2007, China maintained its non-
interference policy towards Sudan, supporting each new government with little regard for 
the domestic actions of Sudan. Following the military coup in 1989, the National Islamic 
Front took power in Sudan.209 China participated in a $300 million arms sale to 
Khartoum in 1991, and in 1994 was rewarded with a Sudanese request for assistance in 
developing Sudan’s oil fields.210  
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Figure 8.  Chinese Import from Sudan211 
While 2007 highlighted China’s major shift in foreign policy towards Sudan, 
China’s changing relationship with Sudan began brewing following the establishment of 
Sudan-China oil exports in the mid-1990s.212 China was unable to continue a purely 
economic relationship with Sudan, as political tensions with the West rose when Sudan 
was declared a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993.213 The UN Security Council placed 
sanctions on Khartoum in 1996 and 1997 following its attempt to assassinate the 
Egyptian President. Throughout this time period, however, China continued oil 
exploration and proved to be a much needed ally for Sudan during diplomatic isolation 
from the international community.214 China’s ability to disregard criticism from the West 
slowly became more difficult as China emerged as a global leader in the early 2000s and 
expectations for its responsible behavior on the African continent grew. 
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China’s movement from “benevolent benefactor” to “reluctant mediator” came 
with political responsibilities never before addressed in Chinese foreign policy on the 
African continent. China’s role as a “benevolent benefactor” focused specifically on 
economic engagement and aimed to avoid meddling in political affairs. China became a 
‘reluctant mediator’ when it realized it could no longer avoid the political ties between its 
economic interests and the domestic affairs of Sudan—a shift that occurred in 2007. The 
end of the 1990s brought increased Chinese infrastructure development in Sudan, along 
with an increase in Sudanese oil exports to China (Figure 8). The ability of China to 
remain strictly a business partner with Sudan slowly began to fade as China’s economic 
interests in Sudan skyrocketed.  
1. Darfur 
The beginning of the Darfur crisis in 2003 introduced China to the difficulties 
associated with maintaining purely economic ties with politically unstable nations. The 
devastating clash between the Sudanese government and rebel groups from the Darfur 
region resulted in wide-spread human rights violations and genocidal killing. At the onset 
of violence in 2003, China offered little assistance in seeking a solution to the conflict, 
and in 2005 commented “business is business” concerning the deteriorating situation.215  
With over 3.5 Million people displaced and estimates of over 200,000 killed, 
Khartoum’s deadly crackdown on rebel groups in Western Sudan initiated severe 
criticism from most of the international community.216 China, however, remained 
uncommitted to UN efforts to establish a resolution against the Khartoum government. 
China debated against any increase in Western sanctions against Sudan—arguing 
sanctions would only exacerbate the conflict.217 Ian Taylor describes China’s efforts to 
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resist UN actions through “abstaining, weakening resolutions, and announcing informally 
that it would use its veto right if necessary to protect China’s interests in Sudan.”218  
Western criticism of China’s actions in Sudan threatened to detract from its 
hosting of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. China hoped the 2008 Olympics would 
highlight its success story from poverty to global power. When Western criticism began 
to spread concerning China’s handling of the Darfur crisis, China’s reputation was 
threatened and attention diverted from its success story. The labeling of the Beijing 
Olympics as the “Genocide Olympics” hurt China’s international reputation and led 
Chinese officials to engage in restoring the Chinese national image.219 Through its media 
organizations, China began boasting of its constructive role in mediation efforts in Sudan 
in an attempt to repair its image.220  
In combination with Western criticism over the Olympics, US policymakers 
voiced dissatisfaction with China’s actions in Darfur. Ninety-six US Senators and 108 
house members sent a letter to President Hu Jintao in April 2007 condemning China’s 
actions in Darfur.221 The actions of U.S. policymakers and critics of the Beijing 
Olympics were part of a greater U.S. movement aimed towards pushing for China’s 
acceptance of harsher sanctions against Sudanese leadership.222 In response to Western 
pressure, China dispatched Ambassador Liu Guijin in May 2007 to take the lead mediator 
role in Sudan and assist in reducing tensions in Darfur.223 China’s move towards 
mediation highlights a significant shift away from non-intervention in reaction to 
Western pressure.  
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President Hu Jintao himself visited Khartoum in early 2007, delivering a speech 
calling for increased efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur.224 President Hu Jintao 
proposed a four point proposal designed to resolve the conflict in Sudan and expressed its 
“deep concern” towards events in Darfur. China’s lead role in the implementation of a 
peace plan for Darfur utilized its strong political ties with Khartoum to provide influence 
not available to Western nations.225 The Chinese mediation efforts resulted in the 
Sudanese leadership’s acceptance of UN peacekeepers into the conflict and ultimately an 
end to the genocide.226  
Following the U.S. condemnation of China’s actions in Sudan and the anti-
Beijing Olympics campaign, China signed UN resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007. The UN 
resolution authorized the deployment of an African Union (AU)-UN hybrid peacekeeping 
mission to Darfur to support peace negotiations.227 China’s UN representative, Wang 
Guangya, commented on his decision to vote in favor of the resolution stating, “It should 
be particularly emphasized that the purpose of this Resolution is to authorize the launch 
of the Hybrid Operation, rather than exert pressure or impose sanctions.”228 
Representative Wang’s comments highlighted China’s attempt to remain in good favor 
with the Khartoum government, while also accepting Western pressure.  
The events in Darfur highlight the significant role Western pressure can have on 
China’s foreign policy decisions on the African continent. The West inflicted severe 
reputation costs on China, which caused it to increase its efforts towards mediation in 
Sudan despite forcing China to act outside its typical non-intervention approach. 
Previously to Darfur, China had managed to maintain non-intervention and ignore 
criticism from the West. As China’s stature in global politics grew, however, Western 
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pressure became a direct threat to China’s national image as a success story in the 
developing world, and therefore pressed China to act more responsibly in Sudan. Post-
Darfur, China realized the power of Western pressure in creating an international 
environment that burdens China’s growth and decreases in international reputation. 
Alternatively, China realized the strength of its position in mediating conflict in African 
nations—especially in nations reluctant to work with the West. The lessons from Darfur 
likely assisted in shaping China’s decision-making process regarding the conflict in 
South Sudan in 2014.  
B. ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
China’s quest for energy imports across the African continent opened a new 
chapter in its relationship with Sudan, and later South Sudan.229 Understanding the nature 
of China’s economic interests in Sudan assists in identifying the influence of economic 
interests in shaping China’s decision to intervene in Sudanese conflicts post-2007. This 
section aims to discuss how China’s extensive infrastructure projects in Sudan and South 
Sudan encouraged China to protect its economic interests, and therefore take a highly 
interventionist role in Sudanese conflicts post-2007.  
1. Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Sudan  
Sudan’s status as the third leading oil producing nation in Africa garnered China’s 
interest leading to expansive efforts of Chinese companies to gain access to the Sudanese 
oil fields.230 China’s oil production in Sudan began in 1996 following a Canadian owned 
energy company’s sell of Sudanese oil rights to the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating 
Company (GNPOC).231 The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) initially 
held a 40 percent stake in GNPOC, but by 1997 became the majority shareholder.232 
China’s oil ties to Sudan were firmly planted and Chinese infrastructure investment soon 
followed. 
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Early Chinese recognition of the need for infrastructure development in Sudan 
began in the late 1990s as China looked to improve its efficiency in the oil extraction 
process.233 Early infrastructure development projects focused on improving Sudan’s 
overall transport capabilities to promote access to desolate regions in southern Sudan. 
China assisted in building airfields, reinforcing roads, and building oil production 
facilities throughout the country.234 China also notably contributed towards building and 
operating the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline—a 1,600km pipeline that flows from what is now 
South Sudan, to Port Sudan on the Red Sea (Figure 9).235  
 
Figure 9.  Greater Nile Oil Pipeline236 
The pipeline was instrumental in increasing the efficiency of oil transportation 
from the remote oil fields in southern Sudan. Later Chinese projects aimed to develop 
Sudan’s power grid, and included the building of the El Gaili Combined Cycle Power 
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Plant and the Qarre I thermal station in 2001 and 2002.237  Once the El Gaili power plant 
became operational in 2004, its output accounted for one third of all Sudanese power 
generation.238 According to Chinese news organizations, Sudan gave high praise to the 
Chinese-built power plants and quoted locals referring to Chinese workers as “Bringers 
of light.”239  
China also assisted in financing the controversial Merowe Dam project beginning 
construction in 2004 and boasting 1,250 MW of power towards improving the access to 
electricity in Sudan.240 Controversy surrounding the dam began after 50,000 farmers 
were displaced and the Sudanese government harshly dealt with locals willing to voice 
concern.241  
Sudan demonstrates the association between high Chinese investment in natural 
resources and hefty Chinese infrastructure investment—largely because of China’s need 
for sound infrastructure to reduce its operating costs.242  When China provides basic 
infrastructure to less-developed nations, governments in return provide China access to 
valuable natural resources to assist in sustaining China’s domestic growth. Chinese-
backed infrastructure development projects in Sudan mirror similar Chinese projects 
across the continent aimed towards achieving mutual benefit trade relations using the so 
called “Angola model.”243  
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Based on the premise of trading infrastructure development for access to natural 
resources, the “Angola model” offers struggling African nations a chance to gain 
valuable infrastructure development without the need for large sums of capital up 
front.244 The “Angola model” avoids direct transfer of funds between nations, and instead 
issues Chinese construction companies contracts in exchange for natural resource 
extraction rights.245  
Working through the China Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank in recent years, Chinese 
infrastructure development projects in Sudan have focused on exploration and the 
continual improvement of transportation networks and refineries in Sudan.246 The China 
Ex-Im Bank—the single Chinese company allowed to offer concessional loan service to 
the international market—plays a major role in funding infrastructure development 
projects in Sudan, and across the African continent.247 China’s economic interests in 
Sudan were drastically changed when the 2011 referendum left Sudan split in two, and 
China’s oil interests with an uneasy future. 
2. Economic Interests in South Sudan 
The 2011 referendum marking the official recognition of South Sudan as an 
independent nation opened new challenges for China’s economic interests in the region. 
The split left South Sudan with approximately 75 percent of the oil fields once shared 
with its northern neighbor and placed China in a delicate position between Sudan and 
South Sudan.248 China’s oil interests were now split, leaving oil fields in South Sudan 
separate from the vital refineries and ports in Sudan (Figure 10).249 Chinese infrastructure 
development projects of the late 1990s and 2000s were now subject to maintaining a 
stable relationship between two divisions with long histories of violent disputes. 
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Figure 10.  South Sudan Oil Infrastructure250 
Disputes over oil transit fees in January of 2012 illustrated the difficult situation 
Chinese policy makers faced in maintaining stability between the two nations. South 
Sudan’s need to utilize Sudan’s ports for oil exports resulted in the establishment of 
transit fees to be paid from South Sudan to Sudan. South Sudan accused Sudan of price 
gouging and Sudan subsequently began seizing South Sudan’s oil. The dispute escalated 
resulting in South Sudan shutting down its oil production altogether.251 After 
approximately 15 months of AU and UN negotiations and a loss of 350,000 barrels of oil 
per day, the two nations reconciled and oil shipments recommenced April 2013.252  
Throughout the oil transit fee dispute between Sudan and South Sudan, China 
took a highly interventionist role in mediating the conflict by initiating talks between 
both sides and attempting to coerce the South Sudanese officials to end the conflict. 
China hosted South Sudanese President Salva Kiir in Beijing and directly pressured him 
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to seek an end to the conflict in April of 2012.253 During fighting over the Heglig oil field 
in Sudan in which both Sudan and South Sudan claimed ownership, China attempted to 
quell the growing violence calling for the withdrawal of South Sudanese forces from the 
region.254 China’s economic interests were once again challenged in December 2013 
when fighting within South Sudan threatened its access to oil in the region.  
3. Ethnic Conflict in South Sudan 
The eruption of conflict in South Sudan in 2013 led China to perhaps one of its 
most interventionist roles to date in the international affairs of others. Unlike its early 
response towards Darfur pre-2007 citing the need to protect sovereignty, China’s 
response to ethnic conflict in South Sudan called for the need to “Protect South Sudan’s 
national interests and its people.”255 The distinct shift from Darfur to South Sudan 
symbolizes China’s move away from its non-intervention strategy and a more Western 
definition of R2P.  
Following South Sudanese President Salva Kiir’s accusations of his Vice 
President, Riek Machar, instigating a coup, South Sudan fell into a violent ethnic conflict. 
Divided between the ethnic Dinkas (President Kiir) and the ethnic Nuers (Vice President 
Machar) the conflict has taken a severe humanitarian toll on the struggling nation.256 
With death tolls in the tens of thousands and over one million people displaced, the 
looming famine threatens to increase long term human rights concerns in the region.257  
When the conflict grew more violent in January 2014, oil production dropped 20 
percent and over 300 Chinese workers were forced to evacuate.258 With 5 percent of 
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Chinese oil imports arriving from South Sudan and CNPC’s plans for further 
development of its oil fields, China’s interests quickly turned to resolving the crisis.259 
Taking the leading role in the Addis Ababa peace talks, Chinese policymakers took an 
uncharacteristically interventionist approach towards South Sudan. 260 Chinese 
diplomats, looking to reach a solution as swiftly as possible, matched Western comments 
condemning the violence and calling for an end to the violence. 261 
The Chinese determination to resolve the conflict in South Sudan contrasts with 
previous definitions of China’s non-intervention strategy. China’s desire to reach an end 
to the conflict was so great that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi offered to personally 
lead the peace talk process in January 2014.262 While the peace talk process eventually 
failed to end fighting in South Sudan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang also met 
individually with each side in attempt to broker peace.263  
China is not discreet in pointing out its rationale for taking a more interventionist 
approach to South Sudan. Ma Qiang, Chinese Ambassador to South Sudan, commented 
on China’s reason for intervening in South Sudan, stating in June 2014, “We have huge 
interests in South Sudan so we have to make a greater effort to persuade the two sides to 
stop fighting and agree to a ceasefire.” Ambassador Ma’s comments coincided with 
China’s deployment of a battalion of peacekeeping troops to South Sudan and 
demonstrate China’s decision to increase its level of intervention based on economic 
interests.264  
                                                 
259 Drazen Jorgic, “South Sudan’s Dwindling Oil Output Forces China to Step in to Protect Its 





262 Wu, “China’s Oil Fears over South Sudan Fighting.” 
263 Wang Hui, “More from More of the Same,” China Daily-Africa, January 17, 2014, 
http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2014-01/17/content_17241427.htm. 
264 “China to Deploy Peace Keepers in South Sudan,” Online, Africa Live, CCTV-English, June 24, 
2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/06/24/VIDE1403582040594778.shtml. 
 74 
Additionally, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi cites the need for “stability and 
development” in South Sudan as China’s reason for its active mediation efforts.265 
China’s economic interests, however, are directly related to South Sudan’s development, 
as 82 percent of the South Sudanese GDP was derived from oil exports.266 When China 
defined its interests in South Sudan as needing to restore stability to assist in promoting 
development, China indirectly declared protecting its economic interests as a driving 
factor in its interventionist approach.  
Zhong Jianhua, China’s special representative for African affairs, alluded to 
China’s interest in stabilizing South Sudan’s oil flow in 2012 stating,  
The diplomatic efforts made by China in solving the Sudan-South Sudan 
issue have been productive, not only easing the regional tension and 
promoting the two sides’ reaching an agreement on oil revenues sharing, 
but also consolidating China’s relations with both countries.267  
Zhong’s comments demonstrate how China’s efforts to reduce violence were based on its 
economic interests—mainly oil—in the region. 
In a conflict largely deemed an ethnic dispute, Chinese definitions of non-
intervention from the past would likely oppose taking such an active role in the domestic 
affairs of Sudan—citing the need to protect sovereignty. The increase in China’s oil 
interests in Sudan and South Sudan, compelled China to reevaluate its typical stance of 
abstaining from the internal affairs of others. While China’s increased economic interests 
in South Sudan played a major role in its decision to intervene, Western pressure during 
the Darfur crisis in 2007 carried over to conflicts the 2013–2014 conflicts in South 
Sudan—pressing China into a more pro-active interventionist role.  
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C. WESTERN PRESSURE 
Western pressure against China during the Darfur crisis in 2007 turned China’s 
attention towards its increasing inability to abstain from internal issues of its trading 
partners. This section aims to identify how Western pressure placed on China during the 
Darfur crisis, translated to China’s handling of the South Sudan crisis in 2011 and 2013. 
In its handling of conflicts post-2007, China proactively initiated peacekeeping efforts in 
South Sudan to avoid succumbing to the effects of sanctions and reputation costs 
associated with Western pressure witnessed in Darfur.  
The spiraling conflict in Sudan during the Darfur crisis garnered international 
attention as the world became informed of the growing human rights concerns. The 
Western backlash over China’s support of the Khartoum government during the crisis, 
resulted in severe reputation costs inflicted to China. In 2006, however, China’s 
indifference began to shift as Western pressure directed towards China began to mount. 
The West called on China to utilize its unique relationship with Khartoum to broker an 
end to the violence, and for China to cease selling weapons to Khartoum.268 Western 
pressure came in the form of sanctions against the Khartoum regime, and political outcry 
censuring China’s actions and harming China’s international reputation. Following the 
extensive Western pressure towards China, Chinese official Wang Guangya assisted in 
brokering a peace deal authorizing an increased presence of UN peacekeepers to Sudan 
during negotiations in Addis Ababa in November 2006.269 In February 2007, Chinese 
President Hu Jintao presented a proposal to Khartoum encouraging the Sudanese 
leadership to accept UN peacekeepers.270 President Hu’s proposal worked, and China’s 
entrance into interventionist politics on the African continent began.  
In April 2014, Western pressure once again emerged in South Sudan when 
sanctions were discussed against South Sudanese individuals caught conducting human 
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rights abuses or inciting violence.271 Leading the growing voice of concerned nations for 
South Sudan, the US initiated the first sanctions on South Sudan in May of 2014.272 The 
sanctions added to the July 2011 UN Resolution 1996 creating the United Nations 
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), which aimed to strengthen the newly 
formed South Sudanese government.273 During the 2011 and 2013 conflicts, however, 
little Western pressure was required to convince China to act. China chose instead to pro-
actively maintain its interventionist role from Darfur—matching the West’s approach 
towards responding to the crisis in South Sudan.  
1. South Sudan 
The ethnic conflict in South Sudan introduced yet another foreign policy dilemma 
for China on the African continent. Severe human rights concerns voiced from the West, 
once again challenged China’s response to violence in the region. In South Sudan, 
however, China took a more proactive role than witnessed in Darfur—seeking to resolve 
the conflict while venturing closer towards Western standards of intervention in the name 
of the responsibility to protect (R2P). China’s early backing of UN peacekeepers in South 
Sudan in the name of protecting Sudanese populations and its willingness to act as 
mediator between the warring factions highlight how lessons from Darfur transferred to 
China’s handling of the crisis in South Sudan in an effort to avoid the level of Western 
pressure witnessed in Darfur in 2007.  
The violence in South Sudan opened international dialogue concerning the need 
for intervention under the R2P doctrine274. Zhong Jianhua, China’s special representative 
for African affairs, said peace talks: “Should be to protect South Sudan's national 
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interests and its people.”275 Zhong’s discussion of the need to protect South Sudanese 
citizens indicates a potential shift in China’s definition of R2P. As previously discussed, 
the Western definition of R2P was more forward-leaning than that of China at the time of 
R2P’s creation. China’s acknowledgement of the need to protect South Sudan’s citizens, 
demonstrated China’s shifting stance towards intervention in comparison to its previous 
‘business over politics’ stance in Darfur pre-2007. UN personnel visiting South Sudan 
described mass killings and targeting of civilian populations—providing justification for 
potential war crimes prosecution.276 China’s support of peacekeeping operations in South 
Sudan followed in form of a full Chinese infantry battalion of 850 personnel.277  
On 03 April 2014, President Obama signed an executive order authorizing the use 
of sanctions against any persons or groups involved in the conflict in South Sudan. The 
sanctions specifically aimed to stop human rights abuses, attacks against peacekeepers, 
and any other actions that perpetuate the conflict.278 Following the U.S. backed 
sanctions, a Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman commented “We will make a decision 
on our position in accordance with the pros and cons.”279 China’s response differed from 
that of previous response to sanctions in Darfur in 2007. As previously described, China 
initially voiced its disapproval of the use of sanctions against Khartoum. Following the 
April 2014, U.S. initiated sanctions; however, Chinese criticism was non-existent. 
Additional UN backed sanctions are currently under consideration and could prove—if 
approved by China—a major indicator of Western pressure influencing China’s actions in 
South Sudan.280  
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Apart from the use of sanctions, China’s large-scale UN troop contribution and 
$24 million in humanitarian assistance to South Sudan signifies China’s increasingly 
Western approach towards intervention.281 Instead of remaining distanced from the 
situation, Chinese policy makers entered into direct talks between parties in a similar 
fashion to Western methods of conflict resolution. China’s mediation efforts towards 
conflict resolution in South Sudan took a more Western approach at the early onset of 
peace talks and continued to increase once US-backed sanctions against South Sudan 
were discussed. Meeting with both sides in peace talks in Addis Ababa, Chinese 
diplomats worked closely with their Western counterparts in efforts to achieve stability. 
China’s participation in South Sudan peace talks is in contrast to its typical stance 
towards mediation—which generally consists of maintaining distance and avoiding direct 
participation.282 In choosing to take an active role in peace talks, China is avoiding 
Western pressure while also improving its status in the international community—
attempting to demonstrate to the world it is capable of acting beyond its economic 
interests. Comments from a Western diplomat assisting in peace negotiations in South 
Sudan in June 2014 highlight the West’s agreement with China’s mediation efforts, 
stating, “The diplomacy of Beijing has clearly stepped up and is more proactive and more 
responsive now.”283 China’s behavior in South Sudan mediation, matched Western 
efforts, and therefore Western nations held little reason to place pressure on China. 
The reports from Chinese media outlets also indicate a shift in mediation styles 
towards those typical of the West. As He Wenping articulated in a China Daily news 
article, “Restoring peace and stability in South Sudan is the common desire of the 
international community and China is shouldering its responsibilities in trying to 
facilitate this.” 284 Similar Chinese media articles emphasize China’s distinctive role in, 
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“facilitating communications among all parties.” 285 Chinese media assisted in bolstering 
China’s image and selling its new found flexibility concerning non-intervention. 
Highlighting its own efforts in the mediation process not only contributed to improving 
the Chinese government’s image domestically, but also internationally.  
China’s changed behavior towards South Sudan in 2014 from that witnessed in 
Darfur pre-2007 is largely the result of China’s increasing desire to improve its 
international image and avoid the connotation of a “free rider” in the international 
system. When China is able to demonstrate its effectiveness at resolving conflict through 
responsible intervention, Western pressure calling China a “free rider” is decreased 
making China able to more efficiently pursue its political objectives. As witnessed in 
South Sudan, China’s proactive mediation decreased Western pressure and allowed 
China to protect its interests with support from the international community.  
Western pressure during the Darfur crisis undoubtedly shaped China’s perspective 
towards handling conflicts on the African continent, which carried over to its pro-active, 
Western endorsed intervention in South Sudan. Western pressure against China in the 
South Sudan conflict has remained fairly non-existent—largely because China is acting 
in a manner that resembles Western standards of intervention. China’s proactive approach 
towards mediation and its contribution of troops, has left little reason for Western 
pressure to arise.  
D. AFRICAN PRESSURE 
Expectations about China and its involvement in African issues are quite 
high, especially as China, with its strategy of being a good friend, good 
partner and good brother, has been a source of inspiration for several 
African nations.286  
—Zhong Jianhua, Chinese Special Representative for African Affairs 
(Discussing South Sudan Mediation Efforts) 
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The destructive nature of the conflict in South Sudan posed—and continues to 
pose—a significant threat to peace and stability of the greater East African region. The 
geographic location of South Sudan presents potential spillover effects into neighboring 
Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo, which both currently have 
deadly conflicts of their own. Neighboring Uganda, fearful of increased spillover into its 
borders, offered troops and military assistance to the South Sudanese government.287 The 
conflict in South Sudan threatens to destabilize the entire region and introduce long term 
humanitarian strife. Because of the regional threat to east Africa, the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) and African Union (AU) pressed the international 
community—largely China—to assist in ending the violence in South Sudan.  
1. Regional and Sub-regional Organizations 
From the beginning of the conflict, the African Union (AU) strongly criticized 
those responsible for violence in South Sudan. The AU threatened sanctions in hopes of 
reducing the level of violence in South Sudan, but as has been witnessed across the 
continent, ultimately held little ability in sustaining peacekeeping operations.288 The 
power of the AU in South Sudan, however, rested on its ability to provide regional 
legitimacy towards requesting outside assistance in resolving the conflict. Requests from 
the AU and sub-regional organizations such as IGAD presented China the local request 
required under Chinese foreign policy—therefore forcing China to intervene, or erode its 
legitimacy as a “good friend, good partner, good brother” to African nations.289  
IGAD Executive Secretary, Mahboub M. Maalim, requested Chinese support in 
resolving the conflict in South Sudan when he “urged the International Community and 
all stakeholders in South Sudan to support the commendable work by the humanitarian 
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actors to enable them reach all those directly affected by the violence.”290 China 
responded to IGAD’s request by sending delegates to an IGAD meeting in December 
2013. At the meeting, deputy Chinese foreign minister, Zhang Ming, articulated, ““As 
South Sudan's friend and partner, China calls on all sides of the conflict to...immediately 
cease hostile actions, and open negotiations as soon as possible.”291  
South Sudan’s President, Salva Kiir, also called on the international community 
for assistance in restoring security in South Sudan. In May 2014, President Kiir addressed 
40 African leaders during a trip to South Africa calling for a protection force to assist in 
defeating rebel forces under the leadership of Riek Machar.292 Along with requests from 
regional and sub-regional organizations, South Sudan itself also called for international 
support in resolving the crisis. The strong amount of African pressure on China, incurred 
high reputation costs should China decide to abstain from assisting in South Sudan, and 
therefore motivated China’s move towards intervention.  
From the Chinese perspective, African nations prefer Chinese mediation efforts 
over those of the West based on the increased trust between China and African countries. 
As Special Representative for African Affairs, Zhong Jianhua, told China Daily, “African 
nations like South Sudan view China and its mediation efforts in a completely different 
light, given that China has never invaded African countries, nor hurt the self-esteem of 
African people.”293 China’s intervention in South Sudan at the request of the AU and 
IGAD, seeks to maintain trust between African nations and China. If it is to maintain its 
“unique” relationship with the African continent, China’s role will continue to grow 
increasingly interventionist as requests for Chinese assistance will undoubtedly increase.  
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Requests for Chinese intervention from regional and sub-regional organizations 
will likely increase as China continues to develop strong ties with the African continent. 
China’s preference to act through multilateral organizations means African regional and 
sub-regional organizations may come to expect assistance from China—therefore 
bringing China further into meddling in domestic affairs. China’s statements asserting its 
image in Africa as mutually beneficial and a friend to all, increased China’s desire to 
intervene in Sudan and South Sudan. Under the pillars of China’s non-intervention driven 
foreign policy, intervention is allowed when a nation requests assistance. If China had 
ignored requests from South Sudan for assistance, it would have faced decreased 
reputation costs on the continent and harmed its title as mutually beneficial partner—
decreasing its ability to achieve political objectives elsewhere. Similar to the crisis in 
Mali, Western-backed calls for China to intervene, without African pressure to back it up, 
would likely fall short in pressing Chinese foreign policy towards intervention.    
E. CONCLUSION 
The conflict in South Sudan is an internally driven ethnic conflict that previous 
definitions of China’s non-intervention strategy would have characterized as the 
responsibility of the host nation to resolve. Because of its strong economic interests, 
combined with African pressure, China’s foreign policy in South Sudan evolved to highly 
interventionist role. China’s actions pre-2007, demonstrate its strict definition of non-
intervention, while its action post-2007 highlight its move to a highly interventionist 
approach towards South Sudan. The dispute between Sudan and South Sudan, along with 
the internal fighting in South Sudan, introduced a serious threat to China’s supply of oil 
in the region. Non-intervention in both conflicts proved too costly to Chinese 
infrastructure and oil supply, leading China to seek a direct role in mediation efforts.  
China’s past methods of finding energy resources where others dare not venture, 
has placed Chinese economic interests in highly volatile regions. This means China will 
likely continue to find itself faced with the decision to intervene to protect its economic 
interests and secure its domestic growth. When Western nations have relatively low  
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interests in a prominent trading partner of China, China will be forced to take the lead in 
protecting its own economic interests and likely be compelled towards direct intervention 
as witnessed in South Sudan.294 
The crisis in Darfur offers a prime example of how Western pressure was able to 
shape Chinese foreign policy. Western sanctions and reputation costs challenged China’s 
economic interests and threatened to disrupt China’s ability to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives in Sudan. International uproar over China’s actions in Sudan detracted from 
the positive image China hoped to gain from its hosting of the 2008 Olympics—
highlighting the increased responsibilities a growing China must consider. China’s early 
and direct mediation efforts in the South Sudan conflict represent China’s more Western 
approach to conflict resolution following lessons learned from Darfur.  
China acting as a responsible power in South Sudan mediation efforts has 
lessened the potential for Western pressure against China’s interests in the region. With 
China’s acceptance of Western norms, it has been able to petition the UN to assist in 
protecting Chinese economic interests in South Sudan.295 China’s assumed role as 
‘responsible mediator’ in contrast to its past as a ‘reluctant bystander’ has reduced the 
threat of international efforts to restrict China’s growth, and allowed it to increase its 
reputation as a global power.  
Pressures from the African continent were also instrumental in shaping China’s 
decision to intervene in both Darfur, and in South Sudan. Regional organizations, sub-
regional organizations, and requests from South Sudan provided the local request 
prompting China to towards intervention. Working with the AU and IGAD, China was 
able to maintain its perceived trust with African nations and promote itself as a mutual- 
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benefit partner. Once China moved into the role as direct mediator, however, new foreign 
policy challenges will continue to compel China towards intervention across the 




China’s evolution away from a non-interventionist driven foreign policy on the 
African continent provides insight into China’s potential emerging role in global affairs. 
As China continues to grow and strengthen its international image, a non-interventionist 
foreign policy creates friction between China’s domestic goals and its foreign policy 
goals. No longer is China able to abstain from conflicts on the African continent when 
economic interests, Western pressure, and African pressure coerce its attention in the 
internal affairs of African nations.  
This chapter aims to first, provide a summary of findings for the Mali and Sudan 
case studies. Analyzing China’s actions towards Mali and Sudan provide evidence of 
China’s evolution away from non-intervention. In each case study, China increased its 
level of intervention in support of its economic interests, and in avoidance or adherence 
to Western and African pressures. Second, comparisons between the two interventions 
will be provided to describe China’s role in Mali and Sudan, and how China took a more 
proactive approach towards intervention during the South Sudan conflict in 2014. Finally, 
additional information concerning future implications for the United States will be 
provided. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The Mali and Sudan case studies provide a useful look at China’s evolution from 
non-intervention, to intervention in the domestic affairs of African nations. China’s 
continued assurance to African nations that it seeks a “mutual beneficial” relationship in 
fulfilling the needs of China and African nations aims to set it apart from Western nations 
accused of over structuring aid programs based on Western ideals.296 In the case of Mali 
and Sudan, however, China’s long histories with both nations shifted dramatically 
following China’s initial economic boom in the 1990s. China gradually became more 
involved in the politics of Mali and Sudan, and struggled to detach its economic interests 
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from its political ambitions in each nation. 297 The growing trend reached a decision point 
in 2007, when China faced growing Western criticism to act more responsibly in Sudan. 
The overall policy of China to seek economic relations in volatile regions, presents 
continued foreign policy challenges towards China as it increases its efforts to 
internationally source its domestic growth.298 The two cases studied highlight how 
China’s economic interests, Western pressure, and African pressure all combined to 
reshape China’s non-intervention driven foreign policy towards African nations.  
1. Economic Interests 
In both Mali and Sudan, China’s economic interests centered on the expansive 
Chinese infrastructure projects built to assist in the extraction of natural resources 
throughout each nation—particularly in Sudan and South Sudan’s oil fields. 
Infrastructure protection and the protection of Chinese citizens became an increasingly 
important part of China’s decision to intervene in Mali and in the Sudan region. China 
sought assistance from the Malian and Sudanese governments during instability, but was 
ultimately left sending combat units of its own to participate in peacekeeping.299 Disputes 
between Sudan and South Sudan disrupted the flow of Chinese oil imports through 
Chinese built pipelines transiting from South Sudan into Sudan.  
The Mali case highlights the difficulties Africa’s porous borders present towards 
economic investment on the continent. The instability in northern Mali, threatened to spill 
over into neighboring Niger—in which China holds a significant stake in uranium 
mining. China’s other investment activity on the continent present a similar challenge in 
nations such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which conflict easily spreads 
across borders.  
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China’s $9.25 billion copper and cobalt agreement with DRC’s President Joseph 
Kabila in 2008 contradicted Western efforts to hold President Kabila accountable for 
poor governance and human rights violations.300 Accusations from insurgent leader, 
Laurent Nkunda—a former DRC army general turned rebel leader who led a rebellion 
against the DRC government—claimed China’s actions in DRC were undermining 
reconciliation efforts in DRC. Nkunda’s accusations and pressure from the West led 
China to deploy an envoy to DRC to mediate peacekeeping efforts between the DRC and 
neighboring Rwanda. China’s mediation efforts assisted in reducing Rwandan support of 
Nkunda and thereby reducing tensions in the region. Since 2008, China has continued to 
provide peacekeepers in DRC to assist with infrastructure development and medical 
care.301  
The Mali and Sudan case studies provide details as to how China’s economic 
interests drove its movement away from non-intervention. China gave a high amount of 
FDI to both countries and was heavily invested in not only the nations themselves, but 
also the surrounding regions. The protection of its investments and maintaining access to 
natural resources, appear to have significantly influenced China’s actions in each case 
study.  
2. Western Pressure 
Two forms of Western pressure were present in the cases studied—Western 
backed norm adherence and direct Western criticism of China’s actions. Under the 
Western backed norms category, Chinese officials cited terrorism as rationale for 
intervention in Mali. In the past, China criticized the U.S. war on terror as a means to 
project U.S. hegemony throughout the world. China’s stance on fighting terrorism 
shifted, however, and took a more Western approach to intervention in Mali to avoid 
Western criticism accusing China of being a “free-rider” in international politics. 
                                                 





Adhering to the Western norm of anti-terrorism allowed China to protect its interests in 
Mali, while also improving its image as a responsible actor on the African continent.  
In Sudan, Western pressure took the form of direct US criticism towards Chinese 
actions concerning its relationship with Khartoum. The West—mainly the U.S.—
criticized China’s support of the Khartoum regime’s actions towards Darfur. The U.S. 
criticism detracted from China’s hosting of the Beijing Olympics—an event that China 
hoped would promote its “success story” rise from poverty to a global economic power. 
The pressure ultimately encouraged China to reshape its message to the Sudanese regime, 
and assist in promoting a solution to the conflict in Sudan. Western pressure from the 
crisis in Darfur, translated over to China’s actions with Sudan and South Sudan in 2011 
and 2013. When the U.S. initiated the first round of Sanctions on South Sudan, China 
failed to condemn or approve the sanctions, but did step up its mediation efforts. Once 
again wanting to avoid the “free-rider” stigma, China chose to take a pro-active role in 
peacekeeping efforts in South Sudan and lead mediation efforts between the warring 
factions.  
The Mali and Sudan case studies identify the important role Western pressure 
plays on shaping China’s evolution away from non-intervention. China’s economic 
growth allows it to take a more active role in international affairs, but its adherence to 
Western pressure allows it the opportunity for political influence as well. Moving beyond 
a purely economic power requires China’s adherence to Western norms to reduce the 
effect of Western pressure and friction from the international community. When China 
adheres to Western norms—mainly those established by the United States, it faces less 
balancing, and is therefore able to focus on domestic growth without needing to 
counteract U.S. pressure. Both Mali and Sudan provide important examples of how 
China’s decision to conform to Western norms reduced pressure from the international 
community and allowed it to achieve its foreign policy objectives.  
3. African Pressure 
Mali and Sudan demonstrate the strong influence African nations wield on 
China’s decision to intervene in the domestic affairs of others. The historical relationship 
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between China and many African nations is based on China’s ideas of “peaceful 
coexistence” and “mutually beneficial” partnerships. When China conducts business in 
an African nation but is unwilling to support peacekeeping interventions when requested, 
China’s relationship with African nations appears much less “mutually beneficial” and 
more one-sided. For China to match its rhetoric with reality, it must seek a lead role in 
peacekeeping operations when African nations request assistance. 
The Mali and Sudan case demonstrate how China’s growing influence on the 
continent have also increased its expectations from African nations to assist. In the case 
of Mali, ECOWAS directly called on China for assistance in peacekeeping operations. As 
China continues to bolster its economic and political ties with African nations, requests 
for China’s assistance will undoubtedly increase, and make China’s decision to intervene 
easier.  
China’s actions in Sudan and South Sudan also demonstrate its role in mediation 
efforts with nations generally hesitant to work with the U.S. China’s longstanding 
relationship with Sudan and South Sudan, allowed it to wield coercive power unavailable 
to the U.S. When it decides to act responsibly on the continent, China’s exclusive 
relationships with African nations outside U.S. influence provide important mechanisms 
for mediation efforts. Overtime, however, African nations may become weary of China’s 
stance as a true contender to U.S. hegemony on the continent should China too closely 
match U.S. policy.  
B. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S SHIFTING FOREIGN POLICY 
China’s shift away from non-intervention on the African continent signals a 
potentially new era for U.S.—China relations on the continent. Achieving peace and 
stability on the African continent is in the best interests of both the U.S. and China. A 
responsible China—promoting development and security in African nations—assists in 
building the capacity of nations on the continent, and in turn, assists in achieving U.S. 
policy objectives. China’s increased risk tolerance compared to that of Western nations, 
allows it to assist potentially in development in areas outside typical Western focus. 
China’s willingness to engage in infrastructure programs in comparison to the West, 
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provides opportunities to complement U.S. backed development programs.302 Overall, 
should China choose to act responsible in African nations, its actions have the potential to 
advance the interests of all.  
With some arguing the U.S. is entering into a period of reduced commitments in 
international affairs as a result of budget constraints and war weariness, China’s 
responsibilities in African nations will likely increase.303 African nations in which China 
maintains considerable economic interests in comparison to those of the U.S. present the 
likelihood China will be expected to take the lead in mediation and peacekeeping efforts. 
With the 90 percent decrease in U.S. imports of African oil since 2010, it is likely U.S. 
policy will continue to turn more heavily towards multilateralism and leave a majority of 
the efforts to those with higher stakes in the region—as witnessed in Mali.304  
China’s increased investment in volatile African nations requires its increased 
diligence in political mediation. Lessons learned from the strained mediation efforts in 
South Sudan demonstrate the steep learning curve Chinese policymakers face in 
achieving peace and security through mediation in African nations. When Chinese 
brokered peace deals broke down in South Sudan and violence raged on, Chinese 
mediators realized the harsh reality that is mediation. With potentially less U.S. 
involvement on the horizon, China’s domestic energy sourcing will become more 
dependent on China’s own efforts in maintaining stability in trading partners, and seeking 
solutions to conflicts when they arise.  
China’s shift from non-intervention on the African continent presents new 
challenges for China’s ability to abstain from future conflicts. In adhering to its role as 
“mutually-beneficial” partner to African nations, China’s responsibilities to intervene in 
domestic affairs requires it to act when requested. The precedence set in Mali and Sudan 
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limit China’s ability to abstain from intervention in other nations—specifically when 
significant economic interests are present. The “slippery slope” of intervention beginning 
in Mali and Sudan, mean China’s ability to return to its more strict definition of non-
intervention is highly unlikely.  
In seeking to maintain influence on the African continent, the U.S. must seek to 
strengthen its support to African nations. Assuring African nations that U.S. interests lay 
beyond counter-terrorism is essential towards promoting U.S. long-term policy goals on 
the continent.305 The U.S. policy of good governance promotion on the African continent 
is essential in checking China should it fail to act responsibly in its dealings with African 
nations. As both Mali and Sudan demonstrate, Western pressure has the power to 
influence China to act responsibly on the African continent when required. 
While China’s increasing influence in Africa is not a “zero-sum game” for U.S.-
China relations, U.S. leadership is paramount in checking China’s actions on the 
continent and insuring the interests of all are advanced. The strength of U.S. policy is in 
its protection of human rights and its promotion of good governance programs across the 
continent. The U.S. strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa, focuses on building democratic 
institutions and strengthening transparency in government.306 U.S. leadership on the 
continent is essential towards promoting good governance as a main pillar of the 
development process in African nations—particularly in addition to China’s economic 
first development strategy. Despite potential inclinations to disengage from Sub-Saharan 
Africa in a budget-constrained environment, U.S. leadership is crucial towards 
strengthening democratic institutions to promote long-term stability on the continent.  
Identifying areas of high Chinese economic interests—mainly infrastructure and 
natural resource deposits—assists in predicting China’s response towards conflict in that 
region. When able to understand China’s response to conflict, U.S. policymakers can 
monitor China’s actions and direct Western pressure should China fail to act responsibly.  
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At the same time, measuring the strength of African pressure allows U.S. policymakers to 
better direct their efforts towards mediation—based on the feedback from African 
nations. 
The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is an increasingly important 
mechanism in which to project U.S. leadership on the continent through its building of 
partnerships and its role in fulfilling the U.S. strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
providing military training to African partners, the U.S. is able to build trust and assure 
its intentions are for the benefit of the continent as a whole.307 Understanding how 
China’s economic interests, Western pressure, and African pressure shape China’s non-
intervention strategy, assists AFRICOM in tailoring its efforts towards the continent.  
AFRICOM’s ability to train and maintain partnerships on the African continent 
bolsters the capabilities of African nations and reduces their dependency on outside 
intervention. AFRICOM’s positive influence on the continent contributes towards 
building mutual respect relationships with African nations—which encourages them to 
seek U.S. partnerships without the need for competing with China over influence on the 
continent.308 Focusing on the needs of African nations over the needs of competition with 
China intrinsically assists in assuring U.S.—backed development goals remain properly 
identified and accomplishable. The United States must continue to promote the ideals of 
good governance and human rights that will lead to long-term success on the African 
continent. 
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